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Executive Summary

T

he world recently watched with dismay as South African citizens violently attacked foreign nationals in communities across
the country. Tens of thousands of migrants were displaced,
amid mass looting and destruction of foreign-owned homes,
property and businesses. Senior officials and politicians seemed bemused
and perplexed by the xenophobic violence. The media was quick to
advance several theories about the mayhem. One focused on historical
factors, particularly South Africa’s divisive and alienating apartheid past.
Another blamed poverty and the daily struggle for existence in many of
South Africa’s poorer communities. A third criticized the ANC government for poor service delivery and a failure to redistribute the fruits of
the post-apartheid economic boom to the poor. Finally, the country’s
immigration policies were seen as at fault. None of these theories explicitly tackles the phenomenon of xenophobia itself.
In late 2006 SAMP undertook a national survey of the attitudes of
the South African population towards foreign nationals in the country.
The data from this survey allows us to analyze the state of the nation’s
mind on immigration, immigrants and refugees in the period immediately prior to the recent upsurge of xenophobic violence in South Africa.
By comparing the results with those of previous surveys conducted by
SAMP in the 1990s, we are also able to see if attitudes have changed
and in what ways. Are they better now than they were in the days that
prompted the South African Human Rights Commission to set up its
Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign and partner with SAMP in a study of
immigration, xenophobia and human rights in the country? Has xenophobia softened or hardened in the intervening years? Are xenophobic
attitudes as widespread and vitriolic as they were then? How many South
Africans were poised, in 2006, to turn their negative thoughts about foreign nationals into actions to “cleanse” their neighbourhoods and streets
of fellow Africans?
The 2006 SAMP Xenophobia Survey shows that South Africa exhibits levels of intolerance and hostility to outsiders unlike virtually anything
seen in other parts of the world. For example:
• Compared to citizens of other countries worldwide, South
Africans are the least open to outsiders and want the greatest
restrictions on immigration. Earlier data showed a hardening of
attitudes in the late 1990s. The proportion of people wanting
strict limits or a total prohibition on immigration rose from 65%
in 1997 to 78% in 1999 and the proportion of those favouring
immigration if there were jobs available fell from 29% to 12%.
• Similarly restrictive views still prevail. Two changes were evident
in 2006, one positive and one negative. On the positive side,
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the proportion who agree to employed-related immigration rose
from 12% in 1999 to 23% in 2006. In part, this reflects the immigration policy shift in 2002 which promoted a new skills-based
approach. On the negative, the proportion of those wanting a
total ban on immigration increased from 25% in 1999 to 35% in
2006. And 84% feel that South Africa is allowing “too many” foreign nationals into the country.
• Nearly 50% support or strongly support the deportation of foreign
nationals including those living legally in South Africa. Only 18%
strongly oppose such a policy.
• Nearly three-quarters (74%) support a policy of deporting anyone
who is not contributing economically to South Africa.
• Some 61% support the deportation of foreign nationals who test
positive for HIV or have AIDS with a mere 9% strongly opposed.
• If migrants are allowed in, South Africans want them to come
alone, as they were forced to in the apartheid period. Less than
20% think it should be easier for families of migrants to come
with them to South Africa.
• Nearly three-quarters (72%) think that foreign nationals should
carry personal identification with them at all times (the same as
in 1999). Only 4% strongly opposed the suggestion.
• The proportion of South Africans wanting their borders to be
electrified increased from 66% in 1999 to 76% in 2006. Only 2%
are strongly opposed to such a policy.
• South Africans do not want it to be easier for foreign nationals to
trade informally with South Africa (59% opposed), to start small
businesses in South Africa (61% opposed) or to obtain South
African citizenship (68% opposed).
Many post-apartheid migrants to South Africa are asylum-seekers and
refugees. How do South Africans view the issue of refugee protection and
South Africa’s responsibilities towards them? The Survey found that:
• South Africans are divided on refugee protection with 47% supporting protection and 30% opposed. Nearly 20% have no opinion on the matter.
• Nearly three quarters are opposed to increasing the number of
refugees currently in the country.
• Two-thirds are against offering permanent residence to refugees
who have been in the country for more than 5 years.
• As many as half favour a policy of requiring all refugees to live in
border camps. Only 6% are strongly opposed.
• Only 30% agree with allowing refugees to work.
• And 60% want a policy of mandatory HIV testing of refugees.
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In the 1990s, SAMP found that many South Africans were generally
not in favour of extending basic constitutional rights to foreign nationals
(to which they are legally entitled). In 1999, less than 20% felt that refugees should always be entitled to legal and police protection. In the case
of “illegal immigrants” the figure was less than 10%. Temporary workers
and visitors were viewed a little more sympathetically although only 13%
felt they should automatically enjoy police protection.
There have been some changes for the better since 1999. In 2006,
there were drops in the proportion of South Africans who would deny
basic rights to refugees and temporary workers and visitors. But the
majority of South Africans still do not believe that either should automatically enjoy police or legal protection.
Since so many South Africans also believe that the majority of foreign
nationals in their country are here illegally, this means, in effect, that
they believe that basic rights should be denied to many if not most foreign nationals. With the exception of treatment for AIDS, at least twothirds of South Africans still feel that irregular migrants in the country
should be extended no rights or protections. Given that the police are
believed to be major beneficiaries of the presence of irregular migrants
(through bribery and protection rackets), this is alarming indeed.
While South Africans clearly favour highly restrictive immigration
policies, it does not necessarily follow that they dislike foreign nationals
per se (which would make them xenophobic as opposed to merely defensive and protectionist). In South Africa, however, the 2006 Xenophobia
Survey shows that negative opinions on immigration policy go handin-hand with hostile attitudes towards foreign nationals. If xenophobes
view foreign nationals as a threat, they will generally attribute negative
motives to “the invader.” In 1999, 48% of South Africans saw migrants
from neighbouring countries as a “criminal threat”, some 37% said they
were a threat to jobs and the economy, and 29% that they brought disease. Only 24% said there was nothing to fear.
South Africans continue to consider foreign nationals a threat to the
social and economic well-being of their country. Indeed, along certain
indicators, attitudes have hardened since 1999. The proportion arguing
that foreign nationals use up resources grew by 8% from 59% in 1999
to 67% in 2006. The association of migrants with crime also intensified
(45% in 1999 to 67% in 2006) as did the idea that migrants bring disease
(24% in 1999 to 49% in 2006). The only positive sign was that more
South Africans (6% more) felt that foreign nationals bring needed skills
to South Africa. At the same time, two-thirds still believe that they are
not needed.
Foreign nationals are often seen in South Africa as “job-stealers.”
South Africans are also sometimes accused of treating all foreign nationals as an undifferentiated group. The Survey therefore tried to assess
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whether South Africans distinguish between migrants in terms of where
they are from. On these issues the Survey found the following:
•	 Migrants from North America and Europe are regarded more
favourably than those from other SADC countries who, in turn,
are more favourably perceived than those from the rest of Africa.
However, these preferences are purely relative. A majority of
South Africans have an unfavourable impression of migrants
wherever they are from.
• Within Africa, migrants from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
are regarded in the most favourable light. Thirty-nine percent of
those surveyed, for example, hold a favourable view of Basotho.
Mozambicans (who only 14% of South African view favourably)
and Zimbabweans (12%) are viewed much less favourably. Most
unpopular of all are Angolans, Somalis and Nigerians.
• The supposed “economic threat” posed by immigrants does not
appear to be based on personal experience as very few respondents have experience of losing a job to a foreign national (85%).
Around two-thirds say they do not know anyone who has personally lost a job or heard of anyone in their community who has.
• In SAMP surveys in the 1990s, respondents were asked how
much contact they had with people from neighbouring countries
in Southern Africa (from which the vast majority of migrants
come). Surprisingly few was the answer (80% had little or no
contact in 1997 and 60% in 1999). In the 1999 SAMP survey
only 4% of respondents said they had “a great deal of contact.”
SAMP concluded that the vast majority of South Africans form
their attitudes in a vacuum, relying mainly on hearsay and media
and other representations.
• In 2006, the proportion with little or no contact had hardly
changed. What has changed is the proportion with no contact
at all (down from 60% in 1997 to 32% in 2006) and with a
great deal of contact (up from 4% in 1997 to 17% in 2006). In
other words, the majority of attitudes are still formed independent of personal interaction with migrants. However, more South
Africans are interacting with non-nationals (and presumably having their prejudices confirmed by such interaction).
In 1999, SAMP was unable to identify a “typical” profile of a xenophobic
person. Strong negative attitudes seemed to be held irrespective of race,
gender, education, socio-economic status or any other variable. For the
2006 survey, SAMP developed a composite “xenophobia” score for each
individual ranging from 0 (very xenophobic) to 10 (not xenophobic at
all). These scores were then grouped by variables such as race, class,
income and so on. The following emerged:
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•

On the scale of zero to ten, the average score was 3.95, suggesting that, in general, levels of xenophobia are high. There were
differences between race groups, however. Coloured respondents
have the highest levels of xenophobia. Whites are more xenophobic than blacks and Asians/Indians are least xenophobic.
• Respondents with Afrikaans as their home language display much
higher levels of xenophobia than all other language groups. Next
were Xhosa-speakers followed by Sotho-speakers, Zulu-speakers,
English-speakers and Tsonga/Shangaan-speakers.
• Differences can also be seen by class. Here we see a bimodal distribution with respondents who described themselves as “upper
class” equally as xenophobic as those from the “lower class.” Both
are slightly more xenophobic than respondents in other class
groups including the “working class.” The “middle class” is least
xenophobic.
• In terms of income categories, average xenophobia scores were
highest in the lowest income categories and generally declined
with increasing income. Those in the R8,000 to R8,999 per
month and R18,000 – R19,999 per month categories showed
slightly higher levels than predicted. In other words there is a
strong correlation between xenophobia and income but it is not
absolute with some wealthier groups displaying higher levels of
xenophobia.
• On average, xenophobic attitudes appear to be more prevalent
among those with less education. Xenophobia scores were greatest amongst the respondents who had no formal schooling and
decreased in intensity with progressively higher levels of education.
• Levels of xenophobia differ slightly by employment status. The
unemployed and those looking for work have slightly higher levels of xenophobia than the employed. However, the difference
of greatest statistical significance was between those who were
employed full time and pensioners, who displayed the most xenophobic attitudes of any group.
• Political party affiliation also shows slight differences. Democratic
Alliance (DA) supporters have slightly higher levels of xenophobia than ANC supporters.
In general, xenophobic attitudes are stronger amongst whites than blacks
and stronger amongst the poor and working class and the wealthy than
the middle class.
The Survey then asked South Africans what, if anything, they would
do about foreign nationals living in their communities. First, they were
asked about the likelihood of taking part in actions to prevent people
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from other Southern African countries from moving into their neighbourhood, operating a business in the area, being in the same classroom as
their children and becoming a co-worker. In both 1999 and 2006 almost
the same proportion (around a third) said it was likely or very likely that
they would take action.
A related question asked what sorts of action they would take against
foreign nationals. Most said they would confine themselves to “snitching” to the police (44%), community associations (36%) and employers
(32%). Some 16% of South Africans said they were prepared to combine
with others to force foreign nationals to leave the area and 9% would
use violence in the process. This surely indicates that the violence of
May 2008 could well have been even more widespread or may become so
in the near future. At the very least, it suggests that a sizeable minority
approves of the actions of others.
An overview of xenophobia in South Africa since the democratic
elections in 1994 shows that the “perfect storm” of May 2008 did not
spring out of nowhere. The rise of xenophobia in the 1990s cannot be
isolated from the country’s apartheid past of racial and class division and
animosity, racist immigration policies, a siege mentality and attitudes of
uniqueness and superiority towards the rest of Africa. Equally it cannot
be divorced from new migration streams, legal and irregular, to post-1990
South Africa. But rather than seek ways to deal with, accommodate and
integrate the new African migrants, South Africans began to rail against
them, to blame them for everything from crime to HIV/AIDS to unemployment, and to deport them in their hundreds of thousands. Only a
handful of South Africans were ever prosecuted for employing people
illegally. A culture of corruption infested dealings between the state and
foreign nationals. Police and immigration officials found rich pickings in
the pockets of desperate migrants.
Facilitated by a decade of in-fighting on immigration policy, irresponsible political statements and an uncritical and xenophobic press, the cancer spread. At first, with some exceptions, it remained in the heads and
words of South Africans. But when thought turned to action, xenophobic
thugs discovered that they could act with virtual impunity. Increasingly
their “cause” became less random and took on the character (and eventual horror) of “ethnic cleansing” campaigns in other parts of the world.
In 2002, a new Immigration Act promised action and a systematic
rooting out of xenophobia in the public service and society at large. In
practice, some isolated anti-xenophobia measures were taken within
the Department of Home Affairs to educate officials. But the South
African Human Rights Commission wound up its Roll Back Xenophobia
campaign and when SAMP published two reports on xenophobia in the
media these were ignored (unlike its policy research on other issues such
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as the brain drain.) The uncomfortable fact of xenophobia sunk from
view in the public policy domain. And when xenophobic violence began
to escalate in 2006, there were ritual condemnations and some prosecutions but not much else.
This report therefore concludes that there has been both a political
and a moral failure. Morally, South Africans have let themselves down
by tending and nurturing xenophobia while engaging in rounds of hearty
self-congratulation about their constitution, their deep respect for human
rights and their leadership role in Africa and the world. In other words,
as the 2006 Survey confirmed, xenophobia and hostility to (particularly)
other Africans is not the preserve of a lunatic fringe but represents the
convictions of the majority of citizens. When one journalist wrote recently that “we are all guilty”, he was speaking truth to power.
Some ANC politicians have questioned how South Africans could
attack black Africans from countries that had been so accommodating to
South African exiles in the days of the anti-apartheid struggle. The key
question is whether the exile experience has any resonance or meaning
for the general populace. If everyone believed that South Africans should
treat other Africans with tolerance and acceptance as pay-back for their
past support, this should be reflected in positive attitudes towards the
role played by those countries in the past and the way they treated exiled
South Africans. Respondents in the Survey were therefore asked how
well they thought South African exiles had been treated in other African
countries. Nearly 20% of the respondents felt that the exiles had been
treated badly. Another 41% had no opinion one way or the other. Only
39 percent agreed that they had been treated well or very well. In other
words, it might be argued that nearly two out of three South Africans
find the idea of reciprocity for past support of the liberation struggle
either wrong or irrelevant. Further questioning would be necessary to
prove this hypothesis.
A section of the media spent much of May 2008 criticizing the ANC
government for the xenophobic mayhem, for failing to “deliver,” for
intensified poverty and inequality, for corruption and inepitude. Quite
naturally, government denied responsibility with a catalogue of its postapartheid successes. This paper argues that this debate misses a fundamental point. Xenophobia is a destructive and reactionary force wherever
it is found – in France, in Indonesia, in India, in South Africa. In a world
of nation-states where national sovereignty is paramount, there is potential for it to rear its head in any migrant-receiving country. The onus is
therefore on the receiving state to design, implement and actively pursue
policies and programmes at all levels of society aimed at fostering tolerance, diversity, multi-culturalism and regional and global citizenship. In
South Africa, government spending on anti-xenophobia education has
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been minimal. Hard-pressed NGOs and refugee groups do their best but
cannot draw on the resources available to the state. Public education
that reaches deep into the schools, into communities and into state institutions is essential. So too is strong political will and leadership which is
action-oriented not just rhetorical.
This report has argued that further xenophobic violence, even a repetition of May 2008, is almost inevitable without the implementation of
short and longer-term measures. Civil society, community structures and
NGOs have a critical role to play. Our concern is with the state and with
what policy measures should be recommended. We make the following
recommendations here:
• All past and future perpetrators of xenophobic violence should
be vigorously prosecuted. There are signs that this is indeed what
the state intends though the penalties should be harsh and exacting for all of those who broke the law, destroyed and stole property and engaged in rape and murder. This is necessary not only to
make an example of xenophobic thuggery but to dissuade similar
actions in the future. The citizenry needs to know that despite its
own dislike of foreigners, taking the law into its own hands will
not be tolerated. The state also needs to revisit past incidents of
xenophobic violence and prosecute those involved as well.
• Too many South Africans, and too many police and officials, have
engaged for far too long in exploiting the vulnerability of foreign
nationals. Corruption in all aspects of the immigration system
needs to become more costly than it is worth to the perpetrators.
At the same time, South African employers who flaunt labour
laws in their hiring and employment of migrants need to be
exposed and prosecuted.
• The deeper problem of widespread and entrenched xenophobic
attitudes needs to be seriously addressed. There is no reason why
the majority of citizens should favour a particular immigration
policy provided they are well-informed about the purpose, nature
and impacts of that policy. But there is absolutely no reason, or
excuse, for that to be accompanied by abuse, hatred and hostility
towards migrants and “fellow” Africans in particular. Attitudes
that are so entrenched, pervasive and negative need to be
attacked with the same commitment that state and civil society
has shown towards the scourge of racism in post-apartheid South
Africa.
• South Africa urgently needs an antidote to a decade of political inaction on xenophobia. Since 1994, South African attitudes
have only hardened. What has been done is too little, much too
late. Required now is a broad, high-profile, multi-media, govern
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•

•

•

ment-initiated and sponsored anti-xenophobia education program
that reaches into schools, workplaces, communities and the corridors of the public service. This program should be systematic and
ongoing. The programme needs to breed tolerance, celebration of
diversity and the benefits of interaction with peoples from other
countries.
South Africans need to be educated about immigration and
the benefits of managed migration. They need to know that
immigration is not really as harmful as they think. They need to
understand that immigration can be extremely beneficial. They
need to know if it is. They need to be disabused of the myths
and stereotypes they hold dear. They need to know what rights
foreign nationals are entitled to when in South Africa. They need
to be African and world leaders in refugee rights protection. They
need to understand that South Africa is a member of a region
and a world and has responsibilities to both. There needs to be
informed public debate and discussion about pan-Africanism, the
economic benefits of South Africa’s interaction with Africa, and
the need for immigrants. They need to abandon a myopic nationalistic siege mentality.
The events of May 2008 may provide the necessary spur to political action. Certainly the humanitarian response of many in civil
society suggests that there are South Africans who are repulsed
and ashamed by what their fellow citizens have done. Officials
and politicians also need to move beyond rhetoric to action
and example. Strong political leadership and will is required.
South Africa cannot hold its head up in Africa, in SADC, at
the African Union, at any other international forum, if it continues to allow xenophobia to flourish. President Mbeki reacted
with “disgust” to the events of May 2008. Disgust at xenophobic
actions should translate into disgust at pre-existing and enabling
xenophobic attitudes and a serious campaign to clear the minds
of all citizens.
With the exception of the tabloid press, the media response to
May 2008 has generally fostered informed analysis and debate.
It has not always been this way. The real tragedy of the last ten
years is the way in which the media has mishandled the issue of
xenophobia. Several research studies have shown how the media
has uncritically reproduced xenophobic language and statements, time and again. The media has certainly been complicit in
encouraging xenophobic attitudes among the population. They
would not uncritically report the opinions of every racist they
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come across. No more should they uncritically tolerate the opinions of xenophobes.
South Africa has not yet ratified the UN Convention on the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.
The Convention is not inconsistent with South Africa’s human
rights and labour law. However, there has been little public
debate about the treaty and knowledge of its content and implications is extremely low in official circles. South Africa should
take the African lead in ratifying this convention and making the
reasons clear to its own citizens. Commitment to and adherence
to the Convention would help to clarify for all exactly what rights
and entitlements foreign nationals have when in South Africa.
South Africa urgently needs an immigration policy overhaul.
The fraught and protracted political process leading to a new
Immigration Act in 2002 delivered a policy framework that is
incoherent and, in many respects, unimplemented and unimplementable. Neither the post 2002 skills-based immigration policy
associated with JIPSA, nor the enforcement measures contemplated by the Act, are working, precisely as SAMP and many
other independent commentators predicted at the time. There
is a need to develop a coherent and workable development-oriented immigration plan and to “sell” that plan to an electorate
steeped in isolationism and hostility to immigration, despite the
many demonstrable benefits it brings the country. No pro-active
immigration plan can survive for long with a citizenry that is so
uneducated about, and sceptical of, the benefits of immigration.
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Introduction

I

“I use perfect in the metereological sense: a storm that could
not possibly have been worse” (Sebastian Junger 1997)

n May 2008, the rest of the world reacted with dismay, outrage and
disgust as South African citizens violently attacked foreign nationals
in communities across the country. Tens of thousands of migrants
were displaced, amid mass looting and destruction of foreign-owned
homes, property and businesses. Media coverage documented the killing of more than 60 migrants, “necklacing” and burning, widespread and
vicious assaults, and allegations of rape. On Monday, 26 May, Safety and
Security Minister Charles Nqakula reported that 1,384 suspects had been
arrested, 342 shops looted and 213 burnt down.1
Statements from senior officials and politicians suggest that they were
– to put it mildly – bemused and perplexed by the outbreak of xenophobic violence. In a media briefing on 20 May 2008, for example, Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad described the “unprecedented
savage attacks against South Africans and fellow Africans” as a “totally
unexpected phenomenon in our country.”2 Government, Pahad stated,
was “not taken by surprise by the possibility of these attacks” but rather
by the “extent and nature including the violence of what we have witnessed.” Pahad lamented: “You would not have thought that 14 years
into our democracy we would suddenly experience such an explosion of
attacks against foreigners when we have been trying through education
and political processes to inform people about our vision of one Africa
and an integrated Africa.”3 Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka
expressed similar confusion and consternation in a statement made on
May 23, as widespread violence escalated in the Western Cape: “I just
cannot believe that normal South Africans are anti their African brothers
and sisters. I just cannot believe this.”4
Defending government’s allegedly tardy response to the first xenophobic attacks, Safety and Security Minister Charles Nqakula also described
the violence as “strange”, given that many South Africans had sought
refuge in neighbouring countries under apartheid.5 Also perplexed was
the Minister for Home Affairs Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, whose Ministry
has the most interaction with foreign nationals and who has promoted
anti-xenophobia training amongst officials in her employ. At a briefing
to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs on the 13
May 2008, Mapisa-Nqakula reportedly commented that it was “strange
that people who had lived together for many years were suddenly at each
other’s throats.” She speculated about the possibility of a “third force”
involved in orchestrating xenophobic violence, suggesting that “there
could be people who are stoking fires because these are people who
11
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have been living side by side for a very long time.”6 Days later, in a radio
interview on SAFM, the Minister reiterated that she was “shocked” and
“puzzled” that the spate of xenophobic violence had reached such a fever
pitch.
The response of the Intelligence Community was similar. NIA
Director General, Manala Manzini, in what must rank as one of the
stranger reactions to the situation, reportedly argued on 22 May 2008
that the violence was orchestrated “by internal and external racist elements bent on destabilising next year’s general election.”7 On 23 May
2008, Minister Ronnie Kasrils reportedly admitted “that the government
had been taken by surprise by the attacks.” Kasrils conceded that “Of
course we were aware something was brewing. It is one thing to know
there is a social problem and another thing to know when that outburst
will occur.”8 The sum of these government statements appears to be, at
most, an awareness of xenophobia as an abstract “social problem” – to
use Kasril’s words – but an apparent disconnect with the possibility that
violence was a possible or even likely outcome.
In stark contrast to the puzzled response of politicians, media commentators were quick to advance various theories to explain the mayhem. On 23 May 2008, the Sowetan, for example, claimed that “some
rotten apples are committing inexplicable atrocities.”9 In other words,
responsibility lay with a small group of sociopaths whose irrational
behaviour defied explanation. At the other end of the spectrum, Andile
Mngxitama suggested in City Press on 17 May 2008 that “all of South
Africa is guilty.”10
Generally, the media identified four inter-linked culprits: one historical, one material, one political and one managerial. In terms of the historical causes, Mngxitama, for example, located them “deep in our colonial and apartheid history.”11 Janet Smith, too, wrote of South African’s
long history of hatred of otherness.”12 While the precise connections
between “ history” and the present crisis were not articulated by either,
these journalists touched on an important point: xenophobia in South
Africa has a past which we ignore at our peril.
Those preferring material explanations for the violence cited a massive income gap and “gnawing poverty” as the cause of growing xenophobia.13 Typical was the editorial in the Mail & Guardian of 2 June 2006:
Frustrated by escalating costs of living and competition for
houses and jobs, poor South Africans, mostly uneducated
about the role that fellow Africans played in the South
African liberation struggle, are picking the easiest scapegoats
amongst them – foreigners.14
Here, not only is historical amnesia seen as a direct cause of the
12
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attacks, but poverty is the driving force behind them. Certainly, the incidence of xenophobic violence is strongly correlated with the geography
of poverty. But this simply begs the question of why not all poor areas (in
many of which foreign nationals are resident) erupted or why poor South
Africans aren’t attacking each other with similar ferocity. Academic commentators have similarly tended to target poverty and inequality as major
precipitating factors.15
Phumza Macanda blamed the “failure to spread South Africa’s economic gains to the poor” claiming that this has “fuelled violence against
immigrants and could spark wider unrest.”16 Whose failure? Implicit here
is a veiled criticism of the state. Journalists like Macanda posit a political
or, more accurately, a politicised explanation for the violence. They ask
who is responsible for the poverty and inequality that “causes” xenophobia and identify government and the ANC. So while politicians expressed
bewilderment, journalists blamed the politicians. For example, Justice
Malala writing in the Sunday Times on 19 May 2008, cited a “cocktail”
mixed by the ANC: “stubborn denialism on Zimbabwe, an increasingly
incompetent and corrupt police service, poor service delivery and corruption in public departments.”17 For S’Thembiso Msoni, the violence
exposed the extent to which “the country’s political leadership is disconnected from poor communities.”18 South Africans are frustrated with the
slow pace of delivery and the lack of job opportunities.19 Mbeki himself
was accused of failing to sell pan-Africanism to his own people, so government not only apparently caused the disease, it failed to supply the
antidote.20
The theme of government culpability was taken up by other commentators. Saki Macozoma, President of Business Leadership South Africa,
saw the events as the result of “pent-up frustration over poor service
delivery, lack of leadership and the legacy of apartheid” combining with
“a culture of violence and general criminality” to produce conditions for
the “perfect storm.”21 At the other end of the spectrum, Blade Nzimande
of the South African Communist Party, blamed the political failures of
the ANC, seeing the violence as “one expression of the weakening and
near decay of the structure of the ANC on the ground and their inability
to lead progressive community struggles and failures to detect resulting
plans against our African brothers and sisters.”22 Unsurprisingly, government quickly denied any connections between its policies and the violence.23
The themes of poverty, inequality and government failure were
enthusiastically embraced by the foreign media. The New York Times,
for example, claimed that xenophobia had escalated from an occasional
malady to a contagion. The root cause was the gap between rich and
poor and disillusionment by South Africans “at the bottom.”24 The Times
13
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of London argued that Mbeki had “failed spectacularly” to channel the
proceeds of a post-apartheid economic boom to the poor in the townships and to deal firmly with Zimbabwe (the source of a growing number
of desperate and destitute migrants).25 Canadian correspondent for the
Toronto Globe and Mail, Stephanie Nolen, argued that “the culture of
xenophobia originates at the top: the notorious Department of Home
Affairs treats refugees and asylum seekers abysmally. Multiple reports
from human-rights organizations have documented how corrupt officials
demand bribes to extend asylum papers and police officers tear up valid
papers, then deport ‘illegals.’”26
Finally, some commentators relate the xenophobic violence to the
failure by the state to control the country’s borders. The IFP, for example,
argues that xenophobia is a result of the ANC leaving South Africa’s
borders “wide open.”27 South Africa, the general argument goes, is being
“flooded” by Africa’s poor and destitute. During the 1990s, outsiders
were described as “aliens.” Since 2002, they have become “foreigners.”
Supposedly more neutral, this phrase has the same intent: to clearly differentiate those who “belong” from those who do not. Descriptions of
the in-migration of aliens or foreigners are usually accompanied by vacuous “estimates” of the numbers involved, invariably in the “millions.”
Xenophobia, in this specious view, is an inevitable consequence of a failure by the state to control migration.
The logical extension of this argument was recently articulated by the
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) as follows: “It is essential
that government move urgently and effectively to protect South Africa’s
borders and points-of-entry. No migration policy or strategy aimed at
alleviating xenophobic tensions can be contemplated if the national borders are porous and people can come and go as they please.”28 In other
words, keep “aliens” and “foreigners” out and there will be no xenophobia. What this fails to recognize, of course, is that this is precisely what
the South African state has been trying to do since 1994, actually since
1910, without much success. The post-apartheid state could no more seal
its borders than the apartheid state before it. And why should it when
cross-border movement is a longstanding historical reality, when freer
movement is inevitable as regional integration proceeds and when managed migration brings many (unacknowledged) benefits to South Africa?
Influential commentator on international affairs, Gwynne Dwyer,
completely missed the mark when he identified the “root problem” as
government’s “non-interventionist” and “open doors” policy on immigration and its “refusal to control or even count the number of people arriving in South Africa from other African countries.”29 Apparently this policy has led to “five million” illegal immigrants in South Africa. Dwyer’s
comments reveal a startling ignorance about migration policy in South
14
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Africa and are of interest only so far as they reproduce the xenophobic
imagery and stereotypes that are fuelling anti-immigrant violence.
None of these media commentators remotely explain how the country
arrived at this pass, fourteen years into democracy, and with perhaps the
most liberal and human-rights based Constitution in the world. SAMP
research suggests that the current xenophobic violence is the outcome of
widespread and long-standing anti-foreign sentiment and a different kind
of political failure: a failure to heed the warning signs that stretch back
at least a decade. There has been a growing tendency within government
to view the events of May 2008 as criminal rather than xenophobic. In a
recent parliamentary debate one MP proposed that the use of derogatory
terms such as “makwerekwere” to describe foreign nationals be banned.
Thabo Mbeki’s reported response was very revealing: “the use of the term
dated back many decades and could therefore not be blamed for the violence.”30 In other words, it appears that xenophobic language is acceptable and not a relevant factor.
In contrast, this report argues that xenophobic language and actions
are as unacceptable and unconstitutional as racist language and actions.
Xenophobic attitudes are widespread and entrenched in South Africa
and not the preserve of a small (criminal) minority. Our intention is to
foreground xenophobia itself as a key explanation for the xenophobic
violence of May 2006. We provide an analysis of the extent and nature
of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa, and give that analysis some
historical depth. Fourteen years into the new dispensation, long after the
first flush of nationhood has faded, are South Africans still as xenophobic
as they demonstrably were in the 1990s? The report addresses the following questions:
• What is the nature of xenophobia in South Africa? A common
dictionary definition of xenophobia is, quite literally, the “hatred
or fear of foreigners or strangers”, combining the Greek xenos
(foreign) with phobos (fear). How has xenophobia infected attitudes, perceptions and, increasingly, actions towards non-nationals living in South Africa?
• Is the current violence a function of xenophobic sentiment and
action or of material deprivation and political failure or both?
What is striking about the response of politicians and the media
to the current crisis is a failure to contextualize the roots of
xenophobia in South Africa and a failure to offer any plausible
explanation of the phenomenon itself. In other words, are South
Africans actually xenophobic? Or, since it would be unfair and
inaccurate to tar all with the same brush, which South Africans
are xenophobic and why?
• What clues to the current mayhem in South Africa are there in
15
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the current attitudes and perceptions of South Africans towards
non-nationals?
• What are the policy implications for anti-xenophobia action and
education in South Africa?
The report is based on the results of a 2006 national survey of South
African attitudes to migration, migrants and refugees. Conducted on the
eve of the “perfect storm” the survey provides important insights into the
contemporary mindset of all South Africans and explains why the population was primed for just this sort of eventuality. While SAMP has been
advising of the dangers of unchecked xenophobia for many years, its decision to revisit the issue of South African attitudes to migration turns out
to be of much greater relevance than anticipated.

A Short History of Post-Apartheid Xenophobia

I

n 1995, a report by the Southern African Bishops’ Conference concluded: “There is no doubt that there is a very high level of xenophobia in our country .... One of the main problems is that a variety
of people have been lumped together under the title of ‘illegal immigrants’, and the whole situation of demonising immigrants is feeding the
xenophobia phenomenon.” In 1996, Jonathan Crush identified a “blunt,
and increasingly bellicose, mythology targeted at non-South Africans
living in the country” and its use by politicians and the press to “whip
up” anti-immigrant sentiment.31 A year later, a study from the Human
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) reported widespread negative attitudes to migrants among South Africans with whites the most negative.
Writing in 1998, Sheena Duncan of the Black Sash warned that the
“xenophobia that is growing so quickly among South Africans is cause for
serious concern.” Duncan blamed politicians, bureaucrats and the media
for exacerbating the situation: “They repeatedly quote discredited figures
for the number of ‘illegal aliens’ said to be in South Africa and then very
often go on to link those figures to the crime wave They are aided and
abetted by some sections of the media who do not investigate but merely
report inaccurate statements.”32
As early as 1994, Home Affairs Minister Buthelezi depicted “illegal aliens” as a direct threat to the success of the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP), and to the safety and security of all
South Africans.33 In the same statement, Buthelezi drew direct links
between migrants and crime, citing “evidence” that “aliens” were
responsible for “criminal activities such as drug-trafficking, prostitution
and money-laundering in what can only be described as typical Mafiaactivity.” He harshly condemned South Africans offering protection to
undocumented migrants, and condemned citizens who employed “illegal
16
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aliens”, announcing that he was “thinking of proposing to Cabinet consideration of legislation which will impose severe punishment for people
who employ illegal aliens as it is in fact unpatriotic to employ illegal
aliens at the expense of our own people.” Further, Buthelezi encouraged
citizens to become actively involved in the enforcement of the Aliens
Control Act. He called on citizens to “aid the Department and the South
African Police Services in the detection, prosecution and removal of
illegal aliens from the country”, emphasizing that the “cooperation of the
community is required in the proper execution of the Department’s functions.”
In his 1997 Budget Speech to Parliament, Buthelezi said: “With an
illegal population estimated at between 2.5 million and 5 million, it is
obvious that the socio-economic resources of the country, which are
under severe strain as it is, are further being burdened by the presence
of illegal aliens.”34 In a Memorandum to Cabinet, Buthelezi called on his
colleagues to declare “illegal immigration” the most important threat facing South Africa and proposed the adoption of “draconian” solutions to
the “problem.”
While Minister Buthelezi was the most vocal politician expounding on
the threats of “illegal aliens”, he was not isolated from the larger political
climate in South Africa, which placed high value on restricting access,
and controlling and limiting immigration.35 Defence Minister Joe Modise
publically blamed migrants for South Africa’s spiralling crime rate: “As
for crime, the army is helping the police get rid of crime and violence
in the country. However, what can we do? We have one million illegal
immigrants in our country who commit crimes.”36 In a speech made at a
Defence Force Day Parade in 1997, President Nelson Mandela referred
to the “threats posed by illegal immigrants, gun running and drug smuggling.”37 When Human Rights Watch produced a report critical of South
Africa’s treatment of foreign migrants, the organization was castigated
by Buthelezi and the ANC Deputy Minister of Home Affairs. In 2000,
a major “crime offensive” (known as Operation Crackdown) actually
focused primarily on arresting and deporting irregular migrants. Police
Commissioner Selebi and Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete,
were unapologetic about evidence of police abuse of migrants.38
The idea that South Africa was being ‘swamped’ by Africa’s poor and
desperate was given regrettable “scientific legitimacy” by the Human
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) which not only erroneously claimed
that there were 5-8 million “illegal aliens” in the country but painted a
picture of a country inundated by impoverished “floods” and “hordes”
from the rest of Africa.39 Conservative academics and an uncritical
media perpetuated and intensified the hostile atmosphere.40 In concert with the HSRC, the Home Affairs Department also succeeded in
17
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killing off the Southern African Development Community (SADC)’s
Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in Southern Africa in 1998.41
Buthelezi responded to the Free Movement Protocol by stating: “South
Africa is faced with another threat, and that is the SADC ideology of
free movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose where you
live or work. Free movement of persons spells disaster for our country.”42
Meanwhile, Aliens Control Units were let loose on the streets and
workplaces. Citizens planning anti-foreign attacks in May 2008 need
have looked no further for inspiration than the often lawless activities
of these Units in the 1990s as they swept through townships; arresting people at random on the basis of vaccination marks, skin colour or
the way they pronounced words; tearing up documentation; allowing
local residents to help themselves to the spoils; dumping the deportees
in holding centres like the notorious Lindela and loading them up like
convicts on trains at Johannesburg Station for the ride to Ressano Garcia
on the border with Mozambique.43 Many trains arrived virtually empty
as the police accepted bribes to drop off people at stations in between
so that they could return to Johannesburg. At a time when South Africa
had no pro-active immigration policy (1994-2002), over 1 million people
were rounded up under the 1991 Aliens Control Act and deported with
no due process (over 90% to other SADC countries). Deportations have
intensified still further since 2002 (Figure 1), exceeding 250,000 in 2006
alone.
Figure 1: Deportations of Foreign Nationals from South Africa, 1990-2006
300 000 –

Number of Deportations
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Evidence of growing anti-foreign sentiment in the “new South Africa”
after 1994 prompted SAMP (as one of its very first research activities) to
examine the attitudes of South Africans towards migrants and immigration. In 1997, a national survey of South African attitudes on immigration was conducted and published.44 The results shocked the researchers.
First, as the study noted, opposition to immigration and foreign citizens
was “widespread.”45 Second, South Africans were more hostile to immigration than citizens of any other country for which comparable data was
available. Third, the public had actually become more intolerant since
1994. Another study, for example, showed that Mozambicans who had
lived side-by-side with South Africans before 1994 were ostracized and
marginalized after 1994.46 Fourth, and most alarming of all, “these attitudes cut across income groups, age groups and groups with very different
levels of education.”47
There were some attitudinal differences by race but these were not
large. In other words, SAMP concluded, unlike in other countries, it
was impossible to identify a “typical” xenophobe. Xenophobia was too
widespread and infected all sectors of society. SAMP had uncovered “an
attitudinal profile that will not be easily overcome.”48 It urged government and the media to embark on a major public awareness and education campaign to counter xenophobia. Subsequent SAMP analyses of the
South African media argued that the media was exacerbating rather than
mitigating the spread and intensity of xenophobic sentiment.49
In the late 1990s, a number of local and international organisations
released reports documenting intense anti-foreigner sentiment amongst
South Africans, as well as rights abuses against migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees.50 In 1998, in its Braamfontein Statement, the SAHRC
noted that “xenophobia is a blight on our democratic values and should
be eradicated.”51 COSATU’s 2001 Statement on Xenophobia noted that
xenophobia had grown to “unacceptable proportions” and called on government, civil society and all organs of the state to “prioritize the fighting
of xenophobia.”52
In 1999, SAMP repeated its attitudinal survey, adding an assessment
of South African attitudes to refugees and refugee protection. Very little
had changed, despite the best efforts of the South African Human Rights
Commission and its “Roll Back Xenophobia” campaign. The survey confirmed “high levels of societal intolerance towards non-citizens (whether
legal or illegal, immigrants or migrants, refugees or asylum seekers).”53
Only 47% felt that South Africa should offer protection to refugees. As
many as 70% felt that refugees in the country should never have the
right to freedom of speech or movement. Less than 20% felt that refugees
should always enjoy legal and police protection or access to basic services.
Once again, hostility to foreign migrants did not appear to be confined to any one racial, social or economic group. On many indices of
19
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xenophobia the South African population showed a 70:30 or 60:40 split
but it was impossible to say with certainty which kinds of South African
fell into each group. The study also found that while “white immigrants
are not immune from the subtler forms of South African resentment their
presence does not prompt the kind of panic and hostility that seems to
attach to African migrants, immigrants and refugees.”54 Finally, the survey showed that South Africans’ first-hand contact with other Africans
in the country was relatively limited. As a result, “hostile attitudes are
mainly driven not by experience but by stereotype and myth.”55
A more sophisticated statistical analysis of the survey results examined how xenophobic attitudes were related to perceptions of deprivation.56 It is well-known that unfavourable comparisons generate feelings
of dissatisfaction, and these lead to prejudice and intergroup hostility,
threats to identity and self-esteem, economic threat and frustration. This
hypothesis was confirmed in the study. However, the study also examined how relative gratification affected attitudes towards non-nationals.
Conventional wisdom is that the less people feel deprived, the less likely
they are to display negative attitudes and behaviours. The study of South
African attitudes found that “both relative gratification and relative
deprivation are associated with greater levels of prejudice toward both
African and Western immigrants to South Africa.” In other words, in
South Africa, those who perceive themselves as relatively more privileged
display very similar prejudices to those who see themselves as relatively
underprivileged.
In the years since 1999, a great deal of analysis has been conducted
on the causes, consequences and impact of xenophobia by SAMP
and others.57 Government did not appear to heed the warnings of the
SAHRC and COSATU and certainly did not move to root out xenophobia as both were demanding. Indeed, the SAHRC rolled up its Roll Back
Xenophobia campaign in 2002 which surely cannot have been because
they thought the problem was solved. Some effort was made by the
Minister of Home Affairs to deal with xenophobia in her own department
but the broader societal initiative called for in the 2002 Immigration Act
did not occur.
When the AU’s African Peer Review of South Africa criticized evidence of growing xenophobia in South Africa, the South African government took strong exception. The Peer Review Report had noted that
“foreigners, mostly of African descent, are being subjected to brutality
and detention.”58 Xenophobia was on the rise and should be “nipped in
the bud.” In its retort, the government nipped back at the Report: “the
assertion that illegal immigrants are subject to brutal and inhuman treatment is strongly disputed.”59 Government said it did share the view of
the Report that “much needs to be done to fight xenophobia” but did
20
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not say what it had done to combat a longstanding problem. The answer
was very little. William Gumede, writing in The Independent, felt that
“long-standing official denial of xenophobia is at the heart of the terrible
violence” of May 2008.60
Violent attacks on non-South African migrants and refugees have also
been a feature of the post-apartheid years (see Appendix). These attacks
culminated in December 2005 in the disgrace at Olievenhoutbosch, a
community near Centurion in Gauteng Province, when groups of South
Africans chased foreign Africans living in the Choba informal settlement
from their shacks, shops and businesses. Several people were killed in the
burning and looting. The exact numbers killed, wounded, and dispossessed vary according to different sources. Throughout 2006 and 2007,
attacks on foreign nationals escalated in their brazenness and brutality.
In a spate of attacks in 2007, over 100 Somalis were killed and Somali
businesses and properties were looted and torched. Certainly there were
plenty of danger signs. Government ministers should not have been surprised by May 2008. The ingredients for the perfect xenophobic storm
have been a decade or more in the making and many-forecasters were
predicting just such an outcome.

The 2006 Xenophobia Survey

S

AMP’s 2006 survey of South African attitudes towards migrants
and refugees drew a nationally representative survey from
respondents in all nine provinces of South Africa. Fieldwork was
conducted in October and November 2006. In total 3,600 South
African citizens over the age of 18 were randomly selected and interviewed. Survey respondents ranged in age from 18 to 97, with an average age of 38. Interviews with survey participants were conducted using
a structured questionnaire. The content of the questionnaire was based
on the research instrument originally used in the 1999 survey. However,
several additional questions, primarily focused on self-perceptions were
added to the 2006 questionnaire.
Further, a number of the five-point Likert scales used in the original questionnaire were adapted to nine-point scales, allowing for more
nuanced and complex statistical analysis. The questionnaire was translated and administered in five South African languages: English, Afrikaans,
Xhosa, Zulu and Tswana. Fieldworkers were fluent in the languages in
which interviews were conducted, and survey participants were able to
select one of the above as the preferred language for the interview. The
final sample of 3,600 citizens consisted of 1,802 males and 1,798 females.
The majority described themselves as black (70%), followed by white
(13%), Coloured (12%) and Asian/Indian (4%) (Table 1).
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Table 1: Respondent Profile by Race and Gender
Race

Male (%)

Female (%)

White

14

12

Black

70

71

Coloured

12

13

Indian/Asian

4

4

N

1,802

1,798

As a subjective measure of income and poverty, respondents were
asked to which “class” group they belonged. Within the total sample,
35% described themselves as “lower class” and 24% as “working class.”
An additional 31% of respondents viewed themselves as “middle class.”
Black (66%) and Coloured (62%) respondents were more likely to
describe themselves as “lower” or “working class” than Asian/Indian
(45%) or white (28%) respondents (Table 2).
Table 2: Respondent Profile by Race and Class
Race

White (%)

Black (%)

Coloured (%)

Asian/Indian (%)

Lower class

3

46

19

9

Working class

25

20

43

36

Middle class

50

27

32

36

Upper middle class

15

3

3

6

Upper class

4

1

<1

7

Don’t know

4

4

3

6

N

462

2,527

442

141

Self-assessments of socio-economic class were generally consistent
with household income, with 48% of respondents reporting a total household income of less than R3,000 per month, and an additional 16% less
than R6,000. Reported household income differed significantly by race
(Table 3). Overall, 24% of survey respondents were unemployed and
looking for work at the time they were interviewed.
Table 3: Monthly Household Income by Race
White (%)

Black (%)

Coloured (%)

Asian/Indian (%)

Less than R3,000

7

59

41

17

R3,000 – R5,999

10

14

20

22

R6,000 – R8,999

12

6

10

11

R9,000 – R11,999

7

3

6

10

R12,000 – R15,999

9

2

3

9

R16,000 – R19,999

9

1

2

6

R20,000 or more

13

<1

1

6

No Answer

34

14

18

18

N

462

2,523

441

141
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Most respondents had some formal education, with only 4% indicating that they had never been to school. About 14% had attended primary
school, 37% secondary school, and 28% had completed Grade 12/Matric.
An additional 11% had completed a diploma, although few held degrees
(4%) or postgraduate diplomas (2%).
Respondents demonstrated high levels of civic and religious identity.
More than 80% across all racial groups see being South African as “an
important part” of how they view themselves, and a similar proportion
want their children to “think of themselves as South African” (Table 4).
Over 80% in all (and 92% of black respondents) agreed that they are
“proud to be South African” though they were much less likely to agree
that citizens of all races and religions share a common culture. However,
the perception of diversity within South African society does not appear
to diminish strength of civic or national identity.
Table 4: National identity*
White (%)

Black (%)

Coloured (%)

Asian/Indian
(%)

Being South African is an
important part of how I see
myself

83

90

84

82

I want my children to think of
themselves as South African

82

92

85

85

It makes me proud to be
South African

84

92

84

84

In South Africa, it is clear that
citizens of all races and religions share a common culture

39

50

51

46

*Percentage of respondents who “Strongly Agree” or “Agree”

In terms of political affiliation, about 76% of the respondents said that
there is a political party in South Africa that best represents their views.
For a significant majority, this was the African National Congress (ANC)
(61%), followed by the Democratic Alliance (DA)(8%) and the Inkatha
Freedom Party (IFP)(2%). However, 18% said no particular party represented their views.
In terms of religious affiliation, the largest number indicated that they
viewed themselves as Protestant Christians (56%), Catholics (11%) and
Apostolic/Independent (11%). A further 77% indicated that they had
“strong” or “very strong” religious beliefs, with 82% saying that it was
important to them to be associated with their respective religion. Only
13% of the respondents said they were “not religious at all.”
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Do South Africans Want Immigration?

B

oth of SAMP’s earlier surveys began with a general comparative
question, developed by the World Values Survey concerning
attitudes to the entry of foreign nationals into a country. SAMP
now has data on this question for four time periods (Table 5).
Compared to citizens of other countries worldwide, South Africans are
the least open to outsiders and want the greatest restrictions on immigration (Table 6). The data indicates a hardening of attitudes between 1995
and 1999 with the proportion of people wanting strict limits or a total
prohibition on immigration rising from 65% to 78% and the proportion of
those favouring immigration if there were jobs available falling from 29%
to 12%.
Two changes are evident since 1999. The proportion of people who
are willing to consider employed-related immigration rose from 12%
to 23% by 2006. In part, this reflects a policy shift by the government
in 2002 which promoted a new skills-based immigration policy. At the
same time, the proportion of those wanting a total ban on immigration
increased from 25% in 1999 to 35% in 2006. Some 84% feel that South
Africa is allowing “too many” foreign nationals into the country.
Table 5: South African Attitudes to Immigration
Let anyone in
who wants to
enter (%)

Let people come
in as long as
there are jobs
available (%)

Place strict limits
on the numbers
of foreigners who
can enter (%)

Prohibit people
coming from other
countries (%)

South Africa (2006)

2

23

38

37

South Africa (1999)

2

12

53

25

South Africa (1997)

6

17

45

25

South Africa (1995)

6

29

49

16

Table 6: Comparative Attitudes Towards Immigration
Let anyone in who
wants to enter (%)

Let people come
in as long as
there are jobs
available (%)

Place strict limits
on the numbers
of foreigners who
can enter (%)

Prohibit people
coming from other
countries (%)

Nigeria (2000)

28

41

28

3

Peru (2001)

18

42

33

8

India (2001)

16

19

27

38

Philippines (2001)

14

18

58

10

China (2001)

14

48

27

11

Zimbabwe (2001)

12

53

26

9

USA (2001)

12

45

39

4

Argentina (2001)

11

45

34

10
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Tanzania (2001)

9

20

66

6

Canada (2001)

7

49

40

3

UK (2001)

4

34

49

13

Egypt (2001)

4

43

40

13

Other findings included the following:
• In 1999, 66% of South Africans supported electrification of South
Africa’s borders. In 2006, this figure had risen to 76%, with only
2% strongly opposed.
• In 1999, 72% felt that foreign nationals should carry personal
identification with them at all times. In 2006, this figure was still
the same but only 4% strongly opposed the suggestion.
• There was a drop in support for penalizing employers who employ
foreign nationals illegally (79% in1999 to 57% in 2006), perhaps
because such sanctions rarely work and have not been implemented in South Africa.
• If migrants do come to the country, South Africans definitely
think they should come alone. Less than 20% thought that it
should be easier for families of migrants to come with them to
South Africa.
• South Africans do not want it to be easier for foreign nationals to
trade informally with South Africa (59% opposed), to start small
businesses in South Africa (61% opposed), or to obtain South
African citizenship (68% opposed).
Clearly dissatisfied with the volume and effectiveness of South African
deportation policy (which has seen over 1.5 million people deported
since 1994), the xenophobes on the streets have made it clear that they
want all foreign nationals to “go home”, even, it appears, those who
regard South Africa as home. It is worth asking what South Africans, in
general, feel about this form of “national cleansing” (Table 7):
• Nearly 50% support or strongly support the deportation of foreign
nationals including those living legally in South Africa. Only 18%
strongly oppose such a policy.
• Nearly three-quarters (74%) support a policy of deporting anyone
who is not contributing economically to South Africa.
• The overwhelming majority (86%) support the deportation of
those who have committed serious criminal offences.
• Two-thirds are not in favour of a policy that would give migrants
without proper documentation the opportunity to legalize their
status in the country
• And, perhaps most worrisome of all, 61% would support the
deportation of foreign nationals who test positive for HIV or have
AIDS with a mere 9% strongly opposed.
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South Africans are divided on the issue of refugee protection with
47% supporting refugee protection and 30% opposed. Nearly 20% have
no opinion on the matter. At the same time, nearly three quarters are
opposed to increasing the number of refugees currently in the country
and two-thirds are against offering permanent residence to refugees who
have been in the country for more than 5 years. As many as half favour
a policy of requiring all refugees to live in border camps. Only 6% are
strongly opposed. Only 30% agree with allowing refugees to work and
60% want a policy of mandatory HIV testing of refugees.
Table 7: South African Attitudes to Enforcement Policies, 2006
Strongly
Support

Support

Neutral

Oppose

Strongly
Oppose

Deport All Foreign
Nationals Including Those
Living Legally in SA

17

30

14

22

18

Deport Those Not
Contributing to SA
Economy

42

32

9

10

3

Deport Those Who Have
Committed Serious
Criminal Offences

67

19

3

6

4

Legalize Status of
Undocumented Migrants

10

16

8

19

46

Deport Those Who Are
HIV Positive or Have AIDS

40

21

15

15

9

Give Asylum or Protection
to Those Escaping War
and Persecution

11

36

17

22

8

Grant Permanent
Residence to Refugees in
SA for Five Years

4

17

14

32

32

In sum, negative attitudes and accompanying support for harsh and
punitive policy measures against foreign nationals are not confined to a
fringe group in South Africa. They are widespread across the population.
The majority of South Africans, still display all the hostility and intolerance that they did back in 1999. This leads us to the issue of rights for
foreign nationals.
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Should Foreign Nationals Have Rights?

I

n 1999, SAMP found that many South Africans were against
extending the same basic rights to foreign nationals as to citizens
(Table 8). In addition, South Africans distinguished between different categories of foreign national when they considered extending
these rights. The rights in question were the right to legal and police
protection, the right to access basic services and (in 2006) the right to
access AIDS treatment. In 1999, less than 20% felt that refugees should
always be entitled to these rights. In the case of “illegal immigrants” the
figure was less than 10%. Temporary workers and visitors were viewed a
little more sympathetically although only 13% felt they should automatically enjoy police protection.
In 1999, therefore, “illegal immigrants” were singled out for rights
denial. This pattern was repeated in 2006. Since so many South Africans
also believe that the majority of foreign nationals in their country are
there illegally, this means, in effect, that they believe that basic rights
should be denied to many if not most foreign nationals. With the exception of treatment for AIDS, at least two-thirds of South Africans still feel
that irregular migrants in the country should be extended no rights or
protection. Given that the police are believed to be major beneficiaries of
the presence of irregular migrants (through bribery and protection rackets), it is alarming to see that so many South Africans feel that irregular
migrants have sacrificed the right to police (and legal) protection by
being in the country.
There have been some changes for the better since 1999. For example, there are drops in the proportion of South Africans who would
deny basic rights to refugees and temporary workers and visitors, and a
concomitant rise in those that do. The fact that the majority of South
Africans still do not believe that any should automatically enjoy police
or legal protection is still sobering, however. Again, while more South
Africans now feel that refugees and temporary workers and visitors are
entitled to access basic services, the majority are still opposed or feel that
such access should be strictly conditional.
Answers to other questions in the survey were generally consistent
with these findings. As many as 27% felt that a foreign national wanting
South African citizenship should “abandon” their own language and culture. Only 15% totally disagreed with the proposition. Or again, almost
half (49.2%) disgreed that new citizens should be allowed to use their
own language and culture regardless of where they were. An astonishing
65% felt that all foreign nationals should be tested for HIV/AIDS and
56% felt that someone with HIV/AIDS should be precluded from citizenship. The idea that nationals from other countries pose a health threat to
South Africans rather than the other way around seemingly will not die.
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Table 8: South African Attitudes to Rights for Citizens, Migrants and Refugees
Always (%)
1999

Sometimes (%)

Never (%)

2006

1999

2006

1999

2006

Right to Legal Protection
Citizens

91

94

9

5

1

0

Migrants/Visitors

13

33

43

38

44

29

Refugees

13

24

44

39

43

37

“Illegal Immigrants”

8

12

29

21

62

67

Right to Police Protection
Citizens

93

94

7

5

1

1

Migrants/Visitors

24

48

53

36

23

17

Refugees

17

27

41

36

42

37

“Illegal Immigrants”

11

13

27

21

61

65

Right to Access Social Services (Education, Housing, Healthcare, Water)
Citizens

96

96

4

3

0

1

Migrants/Visitors

30

49

46

32

25

19

Refugees

17

27

41

34

42

39

“Illegal Immigrants”

9

13

28

19

63

68

Right to AIDS Medications and Treatments
Citizens

97

2

2

Migrants/Visitors

65

22

13

Refugees

50

24

27

“Illegal Immigrants”

38

19

43

Do South Africans Hate Outsiders?

W

hile it is clear that South Africans favour highly restrictive, anti-immigrationist policies, it does not necessarily
follow that they dislike foreign nationals per se (which
would make them xenophobic as opposed to merely
defensive and protectionist).
In South Africa, negative opinions on immigration go hand-in-hand
with hostile attitudes towards foreign nationals. If xenophobes view foreign nationals as a threat, they will generally attribute negative motives
to “the invader.” In 1999, 48% of South Africans saw migrants from
neighbouring countries as a “criminal threat”, some 37% said they were a
threat to jobs and the economy, and 29% that they brought disease. Only
24% said there was nothing to fear. In 2006, South Africans were asked
why they think foreign nationals come to the country (Table 9). Looking
for work (mentioned by 33%), conducting business (13%), and making
money and seeking a better life (12%) were all mentioned. Those are,
indeed, why most migrants come to the country.
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South Africans are also alert to various push factors: poverty (mentioned by 10%), escaping war (6.7%) and food shortages and hunger.
However, there is an undercurrent to all of this. For 21%, migrants come
with the express purpose of criminal gain or to deal in drugs (7%). For
6%, foreign nationals come to “take jobs” and for 5% to destroy or corrupt “our country.”
Table 9: Perceptions of Reasons Why Foreign Nationals Come to South Africa
Reason

N

%

To look for work

1187

33.0

They come to commit crime

754

20.9

They come to do business

483

13.4

They come to have a better life

417

11.6

Running away from poverty

354

9.8

Other

307

8.5

They come to make money/They want to make money

278

7.7

They are here to deal in drugs

274

7.6

Come to escape war in their countries

240

6.7

They come to take our jobs from us

202

5.6

They are hungry/No food in their country

161

4.5

Our economy is strong

158

4.4

Don’t know

140

3.9

They come here to study

94

2.6

To destroy our country

90

2.5

To corrupt our country

75

2.1

They are here for citizenship

54

1.5

They want to stay here

44

1.2

They come to earn a living

40

1.1

Totals

5352

Note: respondents could give >1 answer

South Africans continue to consider foreign nationals a threat to the
social and economic well-being of their country. Indeed, along certain
key measures attitudes have hardened since 1999 (Table 10). The proportion arguing that foreign nationals use up resources grew by 8% to 67%
in 2006. The association of migrants with crime also intensified (45% to
67%) as did the idea that migrants bring disease (24% to 49%). The only
positive sign was that more South Africans felt that foreign nationals
bring needed skills to South Africa. At the same time, a third still believe
that these skills are not needed.
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Table 10: Perceived Impacts of Migrants
% who agree

1999

2006

Use up resources

59

67

Take jobs

56

62

Commit crimes

45

67

Bring disease

24

49

Bring needed skills

58

64

Do South Africans dislike some “foreigners” more than others? As
Table 11 shows, all foreign groups, wherever they are from, receive much
lower favourability ratings than fellow South Africans. Of the foreign
groups, people from Europe and North America receive the most favourable ratings from all South Africans. To say that they are particularly
liked, however, would be incorrect. Just 22% of the respondents have a
favourable opinion of foreigners from neighbouring countries, a percentage that drops to 16% for those from the rest of Africa. In both cases
Asians provide the most favourable responses while Coloured respondents have the least favourable at just 15% and 11% respectively.
Table 11: Perceptions of Various Groups
Favourable (%)

Whites

Blacks

Coloureds

Asians/
Indians

Total

South African Blacks

46

84

43

66

73

South African Whites

59

57

40

58

55

South African Coloureds

39

46

53

55

46

South African Asians/Indians

39

39

36

72

40

People living here from
neighbouring countries

19

23

15

26

22

People living here from the
rest of Africa

17

17

11

21

16

People living here from
Europe or North America

26

21

19

30

22

To better understand where the unfavourable opinions of foreigners
from African countries come from, and why the majority of xenophobic attacks are directed at Somalians, Zimbabweans and Mozambicans,
respondents were asked to provide their opinion of foreigners from specific countries.
Migrants from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are regarded in the
most favourable light, although even here the majority of South Africans
do not hold favourable opinions (Table 12). Thirty-nine percent, for
example, hold a favourable view of Basotho (including 46% of black
but only 17% of Coloured respondents). Swazi and Batswana received
30
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similarly favourable reviews from greater than one-third of respondents.
Mozambicans (14%) and Zimbabweans (12%) are viewed in a much
less favourable light by everyone. Most unpopular of all are Angolans,
Somalis, Nigerians and Congolese.
Table 12: Perceptions of Foreign Residents by National Origin
Favourable (%)

Whites

Blacks

Coloureds

Asians/Indians Total

Nigerians

11

8

4

9

8

Angolans

14

9

5

7

9

Batswana

29

40

14

23

35

People from DRC

15

10

5

6

10

Ghanaians

16

12

4

9

11

Basotho

27

46

17

23

39

Mozambicans

13

15

9

11

14

Somalis

9

10

5

17

10

Swazi

24

44

18

32

38

Zimbabweans

12

13

9

11

12

Do South Africans Know Any Foreign Nationals?

O

ne hypothesis about xenophobia is that “proximity to and
social interaction with non-citizens will impact on citizen
attitudes (negatively or positively).”61 In SAMP’s two surveys
in the 1990s, respondents were asked how much contact they
had with people from neighbouring countries in Southern Africa (from
which the vast majority of migrants come). Surprisingly few was the
answer (80% had little or no contact in 1997 and 60% in 1999) (Table
13). SAMP concluded that the vast majority of South Africans form
their attitudes about other Africans in a vacuum, relying mainly on hearsay and media and other representations. Perceptions of, and attitudes
towards foreigners were as a result of “second-hand (mis)information.”
What is striking is that in 2006, the proportion with little or no contact has hardly changed. What has changed is the proportion with no
contact at all which is down from 60% in 1997 to 32% in 2006. Those
with a great deal of contact was only 4% in 1997 but had risen to 17% in
2006. In other words, while most people’s attitudes are formed independent of personal interaction with migrants from neighbouring countries,
more and more South Africans are interacting with non-nationals (and
presumably having their prejudices confirmed by such interaction).
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Table 13: Degree of Personal Contact with Migrants from Neighbouring Countries
Amount of contact (%)

1997

1999

2006

A lot

4

8

17

Some

15

29

22

Little

20

16

29

None

60

44

32

The 2006 survey went one step further than its predecessors to see if
the amount of contact differed by region of origin of foreign nationals.
Here there were interesting differences. South Africans clearly have more
contact with citizens of neighbouring countries than they do migrants
from other regions. This is not surprising. However, they say they have
an almost identical amount of contact with people from Europe/North
America and the Rest of Africa. This is an important observation given
the highly racialized nature of the xenophobic mania that has gripped the
country. In general, though, nearly half of South Africans have no contact at all with people from these regions.
Table 14: Degree of Contact with Migrants from Different Regions, 1997-2006
Amount of contact (%)

Europe/N. America

Neighbouring Countries

Rest of Africa

A lot

11

17

11

Some

17

22

17

Little

26

29

24

None

46

32

46

Does contact soften or harden attitudes? Asked how positive their
interactions with people from other countries in Africa had been, onethird (34%) said the contact was positive, while 27% said it was negative. Asians gave, by far, the most positive responses. Almost half (47%)
recorded positive experiences, while only 19% rated their interactions
with foreigners as negative. Blacks were the most likely to say that their
experiences were negative (29%) while Coloured respondents were the
least likely to describe their experiences with foreigners as positive (24%).
In other words, the experiences of the minority with contact were mixed.
In some cases contact hardens, in others it softens. Contact therefore
cannot be isolated from the circumstances of interaction.
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Do Foreigners Steal Jobs from South Africans?

T

here is a pervasive belief in South Africa that migrants are
an economic burden and “steal” jobs from South Africans.
The research literature suggests that these are stereotypes
not grounded in reality. The “economic threat” posed by
immigrants does not appear to be based on personal experience as most
respondents have no personal experience of losing a job to a foreign
national (85%) (Table 15). Around two-thirds say they also do not know
anyone who has personally lost a job or heard of anyone in their community who has.
Table 15: Experience with Job Loss, 2006
% Never

Whites

Blacks

Coloureds

Asians/
Indians

Total

Personally lost job to
a foreigner

86

84

91

87

85

Personally know
someone who lost job
to a foreigner

73

67

73

78

69

Heard of someone in
community who lost
job to a foreigner

73

66

66

77

67

Are all South Africans Equally Xenophobic?

I

n the past, SAMP’s instruments for measuring xenophobia did not
allow for distinctions to be made between different groups in the
population. In 1997 and 1999, as a result, there appeared to be
very little difference between South Africans, irrespective of variables such as gender, race, income, and education. Our current approach
sought to develop a general measure of xenophobia which would make
it possible to differentiate between individuals and groups by assigning a
“score” to each person surveyed. A scale was developed using combined
responses from fifteen survey questions. Consistent with the responses
used on the survey questionnaire, scores ranged from zero to ten, ranging
from most to least xenophobic. Scores closest to zero indicate the most
xenophobic attitudes, and scores closest to ten indicate the least. The
scale was subjected to rigorous statistical testing to ensure validity, accuracy and strength.
On a scale of zero to ten, where 0 means “extremely xenophobic” and
10 means “not xenophobic at all” the average score was 3.95, suggesting
that, in general, levels of xenophobia are high. Subtle differences in levels
of xenophobia emerged between different groups in the sample. There
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were differences in the responses between race groups, for example.
Coloured respondents had higher levels of xenophobia (3.57) than white
(3.91), black (4.01), or Asian/Indian (4.13).
Respondents with Afrikaans as their home language displayed higher
levels of xenophobia than all other language groups (3.57). Next were
Xhosa-speakers (3.98), Sotho-speakers (4.01), Zulu-speakers (4.02),
English-speakers (4.20) and Tsonga/Shangaan-speakers (4.20).
Subtle but significant differences also emerged in the average levels
of xenophobia across respondents by class. Here we see a bimodal distribution with respondents who described themselves as “upper class”
(3.72) as xenophobic as those from the “lower class” ( 3.72). Both are on
average slightly more xenophobic than respondents in other class groups
including “working class” (3.96) and “middle class” (4.12).
Consistent with this finding, there were differences between respondents in different income categories. Average xenophobia scores ranged
from lows of 3.6 in the lowest monthly income categories of “R499 or
less” and “R500-R899” to highs of 4.5 in the “R9,000 to R9,999” category and 4.8 in the “R16,000 to R17,999” category. This increase, however,
did not appear to be entirely incremental, with mean scores dropping
for example to 3.9 in the “R8,000 to R8,999” category and to 4.0 in the
R18,000 – R19,999” category (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Level of Xenophobia by Income Group
Less 5.00 –

4.50 –

Xenophobic scale

4.00 –

Total monthly household income

34

Don't know

Refused

R16,000 - R17,999

R18,000 - R19,999

R14,000 - R15,999

R12,000 - R13,999

R10,000 - R11,999

R9,000 - R9,999

R8,000 - R8,999

R7,000 - R7,999

R6,000 - R6,999

R5,000 - R5,999

R3,000 - R3,999

R4,000 - R4,999

R2,500 - R2,999

R1,400 - R2,499

R900 - R1,199

R1,200 - R1,399

R500 - R899

More 3.00 –

R20,000 or more

3.50 –

R499 or less
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In general, this analysis suggests that xenophobic attitudes are
stronger amongst whites than blacks and stronger amongst the poor and
working class than the middle class. Education clearly has something to
do with the latter finding. On average, xenophobic attitudes appear to
be slightly more prevalent among those with less education. Xenophobia
scores were greatest amongst the 127 respondents who had no formal
schooling (3.43) and decreased in intensity with progressively higher levels of education (Table 16).
Table 16: Mean Xenophobia Score by Education
Level

Score

N

No formal schooling

3.4

127

Primary school (up to grade 7)

3.8

498

Secondary school (grades 8 – 11)

3.9

1270

Matric/Grade 12

4.1

1010

Diploma after matric

4.0

369

Degree

4.3

129

Postgraduate diploma

4.0

52

Honours degree

4.4

32

Masters degree

4.3

13

Doctorate

5.0

8

Total

3.95

3508

Levels of xenophobia did appear to differ slightly by employment status. Respondents who were employed on either a full- or part-time basis
scored an average of 4.1 and 4.0 respectively. Those who were unemployed and looking for work, and who could potentially be viewed as in
closest competition with foreigners for jobs, scored an average of 3.85.
The only differences of statistical significance were between those who
were employed full time (4.10) and pensioners, who displayed the most
xenophobic attitudes with an average score of 3.66.
Analysis of political party affiliation also showed slight differences.
DA supporters have slightly higher levels of xenophobia with an average
score of 3.6, compared to 3.96 for ANC supporters, 4.12 amongst those
who support the IFP, and 4.02 amongst those who had no party preference.
On average, xenophobia scores vary slightly according to province,
with highest levels in the Northern Cape (3.41) followed by the Eastern
Cape and North West (both at 3.63), and the lowest in KwaZulu-Natal
(4.22) and Limpopo (4.28) (Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Level of Xenophobia by Province
Less 4.50 –

4.00 –
Xenophobic scale

3.50 –
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Western Cape
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Province

Will South Africans Act Out Their Prejudices?

I

nterview a black African about living in South Africa and most
will immediately tell you how hostile ordinary South Africans are
to their presence. Every one has a story or knows of someone who
has been verbally insulted or physically abused on the streets and in
the communities of South Africa. Many have also had their businesses
looted, property destroyed and their belongings stolen. Particular groups
of African nationals, such as Somalis, have had it particularly bad. Recall
2007 and the nationwide attacks on Somali small traders and shopkeepers, many of whom have been given refugee status in the country by the
government and are therefore here quite legally.
It does not seem to matter how long a foreign national has been in
the country, whether or not they have legal documentation, whether or
not they come from neighbouring countries with strong historical links
with South Africa or whether or not they have married South Africans
and have children born in the country. Many come from countries that
suffered enormously as a result of their support of South Africa’s liberation struggle. All are dubbed “amakwerekwere.” All are outsiders. All are
told they should “go home.”
Xenophobic prejudice is sometimes subtle, sometimes blunt, sometimes violent, but always damaging and dehumanizing. Furthermore,
black Africans will say that prejudice, name-calling and hostility is not
36

Migration Policy Series No. 50

confined to ordinary South Africans. Anyone with the misfortune to fall
into the hands of the police speaks of the need to have bribe money at
the ready to prevent summary arrest, the destruction of identity documents and the risk of being hauled off to Lindela and then home. When
citizens attack foreigners, the police have often been accused of simply
standing by.
In both 1999 and 2006, SAMP asked South Africans what, if anything, they would do about foreign nationals living in their communities.
First, they were asked about the likelihood of their taking part in actions
to prevent people from other Southern African countries from moving into their neighbourhood, operating a business in the area, being in
the same classroom as their children or becoming a co-worker. What is
striking is that almost a third of all respondents in both 1999 and 2006
answered that it was likely or very likely that they would take action to
prevent these things happening. A disturbingly high proportion of the
population in 2006 said they are likely to translate attitudes into action.
Table 17: Likelihood of Action Against Migrants from Other Southern African Countries
Likelihood of Taking Action Action to Prevent Them (% Likely)

1997

1999

2006

Moving into your area

34

32

30

Operating a business in your area

34

32

32

Sharing a classroom with your children

31

27

26

Becoming a co-worker

32

27

26

A related question asked what sorts of actions they would take against
foreign nationals. Most would confine themselves to “snitching” to the
police (44%), community associations (36%) and employers (32%). A
centrepiece of the 2002 Immigration Act, roundly criticized by human
rights groups at the time, was “internal policing.” Under these provisions
of the Act, citizens were encouraged to report foreign nationals to the
authorities if they suspected them of being in the country unofficially. For
many critics, this seemed like a state license for social disintegration, suspicion, conflict and xenophobia. The 2006 Survey shows that citizens are
all too willing to “do their part.”
What is perhaps most significant, in light of later events, is that 16%
of those interviewed said they were prepared to combine with others to
force foreign nationals to leave their area and that 9% were prepared to
use violence in the process (Table 18). Despite the widespread mayhem
of May 2008, it is unlikely that 16% and 9% of South Africans were participants. What the SAMP survey indicates is that the violence could
well have been even more widespread or may become so in the near
future. At the very least, it suggests that a sizeable minority would have
approved of the actions of others.
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Table 18: Likelihood of Taking Action Against Foreign Nationals
2006
Report them to the police

44

Report them to my employer

32

Report them to local community association

36

Get people together to force them to leave

16

Use violence against them

9

Conclusions
“We never mean for our prejudices to turn out violent but
they do – often carried out on our behalves by this unwitting link: this quiet sharing of dirty thoughts by the one who
means not to act it out and the other feeling there is legitimacy in the maelstrom and so acts it out” 
(Saliem Fakir, 29 May 2008)
Stephanie Nolen of the Toronto Globe and Mail writes of a “sudden
eruption of xenophobic savagery” in South Africa.62 Anyone who has
lived in South Africa since 1994, anyone with any familiarity with the
troubling history of post-apartheid xenophobia, will agree only that the
attacks were savage and ferocious. As for “sudden”, SAMP and many
others have been warning for some considerable time that in the absence
of preventative action, such an outcome was almost inevitable.
Reflecting on the events of May 2008, President Mbeki recently
articulated what has now become the standard “official” explanation.
According to an article on the ANC Daily News Brief site, Mbeki
believes that the violence was driven “neither by antipathy nor a hatred
of foreigners.” Apologising to all victims of the shameful actions, he
noted that they were purely the actions of “criminals in our midst” and
would be punished accordingly. He reportedly went on to assert that
those who claim the attacks were xenophobic were themselves guilty of
xenophobia: “No-one in our society has any right to encourage or incite
xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in
the garb of xenophobia.”63
When SAMP embarked on its 2006 Survey of South African attitudes, it had hoped that the President was right in denying the existence
of xenophobia. Perhaps attitudes had changed since the xenophobic
heyday of the 1990s which had prompted the President himself to speak
out against xenophobia? However, instead of becoming more tolerant
and accepting of foreign migrants, the Survey showed that South African
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attitudes have hardly changed at all. There are small glimmers of light (in
changing attitudes towards rights for refugees for example). But when,
in 2006, 76% of South Africans want their borders electrified, 65% want
all refugees to be corralled in camps near the borders and 61% wish to
expel any foreign national with HIV/AIDS, there is a deep and serious
problem.
When Andile Mngxitama wrote in relation to the mayhem of May
that “all South Africans are guilty” he spoke truth to power. Saliem Fakir,
in similar vein, has identified the xenophobic “dirty thoughts” of fellow
South Africans that license dirty actions.64 This report has provided considerable evidence that such “dirty thoughts” are very real in the minds
of many South Africans. Xenophobic attitudes are deeply-rooted, widespread and as entrenched as ever they were. Dirty thoughts can quickly
lead to dirty actions, particularly given the fact that a sizeable minority
of South Africans are primed for violent action against foreign nationals.
They have done so with increasing venom in the last year, and they have
done so with incalculable harm to the country in South Africa’s recent
“month of shame.”
The xenophobic storm that has shaken the country to the core and
besmirched South Africa’s image around the globe has deep roots that
stretch back to 1994 and well before. The savagery cannot be “blamed”
on a small group of angry and disenfranchised poor people, angry with
government and the ANC, and fed up with the growing numbers of desperate Zimbabweans in South Africa. We would argue that finger-pointing in this manner diverts attention away from a more fundamental issue:
that South Africa has become and remains a deeply xenophobic society.
Blessed with one of the most progressive constitutions in the world,
accepted enthusiastically into the global community in 1994 and seen
globally as an African leader, South Africa has shamed itself. And it has
done so because xenophobia is not the preserve of an alienated few. It is
widespread and pervasive, overt and subtle, permeating all interactions
with non-South Africans and affecting the world-view and Africa-view of
South Africans.
May 2008 need never have happened. But it is the culmination of a
long process in which xenophobia was allowed, sometimes even encouraged, to grow unchecked. South Africa agonized about an immigration
policy for eight years from 1994 to 2002 during which time xenophobia
flourished, encouraged by reckless media reporting and a lack of political
will.65 When the SAHRC regrettably rolled up its Roll Back Xenophobia
campaign in 2002, the voice of a strong independent critic of the treatment of foreign nationals in South Africa went silent. At that time, it
appeared as if xenophobia was finally being acknowledged as a serious
problem requiring urgent government intervention. President Mbeki had
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observed in 2001 that “we must be vigilant against any evidence of xenophobia against the African immigrants. It is fundamentally wrong and
unacceptable that we should treat people who come to us as friends as
though they are our enemies.”
The 2002 Immigration Act (which replaced the profoundly xenophobic Aliens Control Act) also included the important provision that the
Act should serve to ensure that “xenophobia is prevented and countered
both within Government and civil society.” In the 2004 Amendment
Act, however, this requirement was changed simply to require that
“xenophobia is prevented and countered.” The Department of Home
Affairs did establish a Counter-Xenophobia Unit through the mandate
established in the Immigration Act, although serious questions exist as to
how much this Unit has achieved. The upsurge in xenophobic violence
is therefore a damning indictment of the general failure within South
Africa to turn rhetoric into action, to effectively respond to or counteract
xenophobia attitudes prevalent since 1994.
Even after 2002, there was no serious and systematic attempt to put
in place government-wide mechanisms and programmes to give effect to
the anti-xenophobia provisions of the new Act. Instead, the media continued to rail against “floods of illegal aliens” and some police continued
to treat foreign nationals as “mobile ATMs.”66 And the ANC government pursued SADC regional integration and pan-Africanism without
ever convincingly selling either to its own electorate at home. Bold
political leadership and a broad based public education campaign in the
media, schools, communities and the work-place would have done much
to mitigate and even avoid the mayhem. They could still.
Some ANC politicians have questioned how South Africans could
attack black Africans from countries that had been so accommodating to
South African exiles in the days of the anti-apartheid struggle. The key
question is whether the exile experience has any resonance or meaning
for the general populace. If everyone believed that South Africans should
treat other Africans with tolerance and acceptance as pay-back for their
past support, this should be reflected in positive attitudes towards the
role played by those countries in the past and the way they treated exiled
South Africans. Respondents in the Survey were therefore asked how
well they thought South African exiles had been treated in other African
countries. Nearly 20% of the respondents felt that the exiles had been
treated badly. Another 41% had no opinion one way or the other. Only
39 percent agreed that they had been treated well or very well. In other
words, it might be argued that nearly two out of three South Africans
find the idea of reciprocity for past support of the liberation struggle
either wrong or irrelevant. Further questioning would be necessary to
prove this hypothesis.
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Policy Recommendations67
“What’s going to happen to us without barbarians? Those
people were a kind of solution” (Constance Cavafy)
The tragic events of May 2008 should act as a major wake-up call to
all South Africans. They cannot rest on their laurels. Commissions of
investigation may or may not identify the causes of the mayhem. What
is urgently required is action, not only to ensure that the disgrace is not
repeated but that South Africans can hold up their heads as they prepare
to host a distinctly uneasy world in 2010.
All past and future perpetrators of xenophobic violence should be
vigorously prosecuted. There are signs that this is indeed what the state
intends though the penalties should be harsh and exacting for all of those
who broke the law, destroyed and stole property and engaged in rape and
murder. This is necessary not only to make an example of xenophobic
thuggery but to dissuade similar actions in the future. The citizenry needs
to know that despite its own dislike of foreigners, taking the law into its
own hands will not be tolerated. The state also needs to revisit past incidents of xenophobic violence and prosecute those involved as well.
While absolutely necessary, none of this is enough. Too many South
Africans, and too many police and officials, have engaged for far too
long in exploiting the vulnerability of foreign nationals. Corruption in all
aspects of the immigration system needs to become more costly than it
is worth to the perpetrators. At the same time, South African employers
who flaunt labour laws in their hiring and employment of migrants need
to be exposed and prosecuted.
The deeper problem of the widespread and entrenched xenophobic
attitudes identified in this report needs to be seriously addressed. There
is no reason why the majority of citizens should favour a particular
immigration policy provided they are well-informed about the purpose,
nature and impacts of that policy. But there is absolutely no reason, or
excuse, for that to be accompanied by abuse, hatred and hostility towards
migrants and “fellow” Africans in particular. We use that term advisedly since there is very little evidence that South Africans do view other
Africans as their “fellows” in any sense at all. How can attitudes that are
so entrenched, pervasive and negative be changed? In brief, by attacking
the disease of xenophobia with the same commitment that state and civil
society has shown towards attacking the scourge of racism in post-apartheid South Africa.
South Africa urgently needs an antidote to a decade of political inaction on xenophobia. Since 1994, South African attitudes have only hardened. What has been done is too little, much too late. Required now is
a broad, high-profile, multi-media, government-initiated and sponsored
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anti-xenophobia education program that reaches into schools, workplaces, communities and the corridors of the public service. This programme
should be systematic and ongoing. The programme needs to breed tolerance, celebration of diversity and the benefits of interaction with peoples
from other countries.
As part of this effort, South Africans need to be educated about immigration and the benefits of managed migration. They need to know that
immigration is not really as harmful as they think. They need to understand that immigration can be extremely beneficial. They need to know
if it is. They need to be disabused of the myths and stereotypes they
hold dear. They need to know what rights foreign nationals are entitled
to when in South Africa. They need to be African and world leaders in
refugee rights protection. They need to understand that South Africa is
a member of a region and a world and has responsibilities to both. There
needs to be informed public debate and discussion about pan-Africanism,
the economic benefits of South Africa’s interaction with Africa, and the
need for immigrants. They need to abandon their myopic nationalistic
siege mentality.
The events of May 2008 may provide the necessary spur to political
action. Certainly the humanitarian response of many in civil society suggests that there are South Africans who are repulsed and ashamed by
what their fellow citizens have done. Officials and politicians also need
to move beyond rhetoric to action and example. Strong political leadership and will is required. South Africa cannot hold its head up in Africa,
in SADC, at the African Union, or at any other international forum, if
it continues to allow xenophobia to flourish. President Mbeki reacted
with “disgust” to the events of May 2008. Disgust at xenophobic actions
should translate into disgust at pre-existing and enabling xenophobic
attitudes and a serious campaign to clear the minds of all citizens.
With the exception of the tabloid press, the media response to May
2008 has generally been exemplary in exposing xenophobia and fostering
informed analysis and debate. It has not always been this way. The real
tragedy of the last ten years is the way in which the media has mishandled the issue of xenophobia. Several research studies have shown how
the media has uncritically reproduced xenophobic language and statements, time and time again. The media has certainly been complicit in
encouraging xenophobic attitudes among the population. Journalists and
editors at SAHRC-SAMP workshops on responsible reporting of migration issues in 2000-1 were extremely unresponsive to any suggestion that
they played any role in encouraging xenophobic attitudes. Many remain
so, protected by a misguided belief that all they are doing is reporting
“the facts.” They would not uncritically report the opinions of every rac-
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ist they come across. No more should they uncritically tolerate the opinions of xenophobes.
A recent analysis of the UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families shows that South Africa has not
yet ratified the Convention.68 The analysis shows that the treaty is not
inconsistent with South Africa’s human rights safeguards and labour law.
However, there has been little public debate about the treaty and knowledge of its content and implications is appallingly low in official circles.
South Africa should take the African lead in ratifying this convention
and making the reasons clear to its own citizens. Commitment to, and
adherence to, the Convention would help to clarify for all exactly what
rights and entitlements foreign nationals have when in South Africa.
South Africa urgently needs an immigration policy overhaul. The
fraught and protracted political process leading to a new Immigration
Act in 2002 delivered a policy framework that is incoherent and, in many
respects, unimplemented and unimplementable. Neither the post 2002
skills-based immigration policy associated with JIPSA nor the enforcement measures contemplated by the Act are working, precisely as SAMP
and other critics predicted at the time. There is a need to develop a
coherent and workable development-oriented immigration plan and to
“sell” that plan to an electorate steeped in isolationism and hostility to
immigration, despite the many demonstrable benefits it brings the country. No pro-active immigration plan can survive for long with a citizenry
that is so uneducated about and sceptical of the benefits of immigration.
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Appendix: Xenophobia Timeline
1994
•
•

•
•
•

1995
•

•

•

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) threatens to take “physical
action” if the government fails to respond to the perceived crisis
of undocumented migrants in South Africa.
IFP leader and Minister of Home Affairs Mangosutho Buthelezi
says in his first speech to parliament: “If we as South Africans are
going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who
are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our
Reconstruction and Development Programme.”
Violence erupts in a squatter camp in Hout Bay when Namibians
are physically attacked by South African migrants who claim that
the migrants are stealing “their jobs” in the fishing industry.
Protestors in Alexandra Township march to the local police station with demands that include “Zimbabweans, Malawians and
Mozambicans go home.”
Gangs of South Africans try to evict Mozambicans, Zimbabweans
and Malawians from Alexandra township, blaming them for
increased crime, sexual attacks and unemployment. The violent
campaign, lasting several weeks, is known as “Buyelekhaya” (Go
back home). One victim, Kenneth Ngwenya, had arrived in
South Africa from Zimbabwe some thirty years previously.
A report by the Southern African Bishops’ Conference concludes:
“There is no doubt that there is a very high level of xenophobia
in our country .... One of the main problems is that a variety of
people have been lumped together under the title of ‘illegal immigrants’, and the whole situation of demonising immigrants is feeding the xenophobia phenomenon.”
A report by the HSRC, based on flawed methodology, claims
there are 5-8 million “illegal aliens” in South Africa. The number
is taken as fact by politicians and the media. The study is not
withdrawn by the HSRC until 2001. The falsified numbers continue to be cited to this day.
South Africa offers permanent residence to long-serving migrant
miners from neighbouring countries. 51,000 miners from
Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland are granted permanent residence

1996
• Violent conflict between local and foreign migrants breaks out in
Mizamoyethu, Cape Town. A one thousand strong crowd tries to
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•

•
•

•

drive foreign nationals out of the settlement. Two immigrants and
two South Africans are killed. A peace accord is brokered by the
ANC mayor, Dickie Meter.
Local hawkers attack foreign traders in Germiston. One of the
leaders of the foreign hawkers, Mr. Patrick Acho, is shot to death.
Somali refugees are forced to stop hawking in Kempton Park after
being threatened, and in some cases attacked, by local hawkers.
On complaining to the police they are reportedly told “this is not
your country, go back to your own country.”
At the urging of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home
Affairs, Minister Buthelezi appoints an independent Green Paper
Task Team chaired by Prof Wilmot James of Idasa.
South Africa offers permanent residency to SADC nationals who
have been living illegally in South Africa for more than five years.
Over 200,000 apply and approximately 124,000 receive permanent residence.
Residents of Alexandra demonstrate at the Department of Home
Affairs in an attempt to disrupt the issuing of IDs to immigrants
who they claim steal their jobs.

1997
•	 Defence Minister Joe Modise links the issue of undocumented
migration to increased crime in a newspaper interview.
• In a speech to parliament, Home Affairs Minister Buthelezi
claims “illegal aliens” cost South African taxpayers “billions of
rands” each year.
• Local hawkers in central Johannesburg attack their foreign
counterparts for two consecutive days, scattering and looting
their belongings and beating the foreign traders with knobkerries. A flyer announcing the protest states “We want to clean
the foreigners from our pavement.” The chairperson of the Inner
Johannesburg Hawkers Committee is quoted as saying: “We are
prepared to push them out of the city, come what may. My group
is not prepared to let our government inherit a garbage city
because of these leeches.”
• Five hundred South African hawkers march in Johannesburg
chanting “chase the makwerekwere out,” and “down with the foreigner, up with South Africans.”
• A privatized deportation holding centre is established to process
deportees. Called Lindela (“place of waiting”), the centre is initially operated by the Dyambu Trust, a venture set up by a group
of top ANC Women’s League figures
• A Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) survey of
migrants in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe shows that very
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•

•

1998
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•
1999
•

•

46

few wish to settle permanently in South Africa. A related study of
migrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg finds that they create an
average of three jobs per business.
A Draft Green Paper on International Migration is produced by
an independent task team. It calls for a rights-based approach to
immigration. Minister Buthelezi and his senior white officials are
unhappy with the report and appoint separate task teams to draft
refugee and immigration white papers under Departmental control.
In December, the Cape Town Refugee Forum claims that 20
immigrants have been killed in the city as a result of xenophobia
that year.
South Africa introduces its first refugee protection legislation.
Problems of implementation bedevil the Act for many years leading to major backlogs of refugee claimants
Three non-South Africans are killed on a train travelling between
Pretoria and Johannesburg in what is described as a xenophobic
attack.
Two foreign nationals are “necklaced” (burnt alive) in Ivory Park,
near Midrand
In December The Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign is launched
by a partnership of the South African Human Rights Commission
(SAHRC), the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
The Department of Home Affairs reports that the majority of deportations are of Mozambicans (141,506) followed by
Zimbabweans (28,548)
A report by Human Rights Watch documents extensive abuse of
migrants by employers and the police. The report is heavily criticized by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs.
Six white police set attack dogs on three Mozambican migrants
and insult them with racist and xenophobic abuse. The incident
is captured on video and aired to public outrage in 2000. The
perpetrators are later tried, found guilty and imprisoned.
SAHRC issues Braamfontein Statement on Xenophobia.
South Africa offers permanent residence to Mozambican refugees
who have been in the country for 10-15 years. Approximately
90,000 applicants are successful. This brings the number of
Mozambicans legally in South Africa to well over 200,000.
A report by the SAHRC notes that xenophobia underpins police
action against foreigners. People are apprehended for being “too
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•
•

•
•

2000
•

•

•

•
•
•
2001
•



dark” or “walking like a black foreigner.” Police also regularly
destroy documents of black non-South Africans.
SAMP releases a survey of South African attitudes to immigrants
and immigration which shows that most South Africans share the
same “stereotypical image of Southern Africans.”
The Department of Home Affairs releases a White Paper on
International Migration and accompanying legislation calling for
a new immigration policy. Human rights groups criticize both as
a recipe for increased xenophobia. The new legislation stalls in
Parliament and Cabinet for three years.
Six foreign nationals accused of criminal activity are kidnapped
by a mob in Ivory Park. Two are killed by “necklacing,” three of
the others are seriously injured and one manages to escape.
Reports surface that undocumented Mozambican migrants being
repatriated to Mozambique are regularly robbed, beaten and
sometimes thrown from moving trains on the journey home.
Sudanese refugee James Diop is seriously injured after being
thrown from a train in Pretoria by a group of armed men. Kenyan
Roy Ndeti and his room mate are shot in their home. Both incidents are described as xenophobic attacks.
In Operation Crackdown, a joint police and army anti-crime
sweep, over 7,000 people are arrested on suspicion of being “illegal aliens.” In contrast, only 14 people are arrested for serious
crimes.
A SAHRC report on the Lindela deportation centre lists a series
of abuses at the facility, including assault and the systematic denial of basic rights. The report notes that 20 percent of detainees
claimed South African citizenship or that they were in the country legally.
A SAMP report on media attitudes to migrants finds evidence of
xenophobic reporting by the press.
Two Mozambican farm workers are assaulted at a farm by a group
called Mapogo-a-Mathamaga after being accused of stealing by
their employer. One of the men dies as a result of the attack.
COSATU issues statement condemning xenophobia.
According to the 2001 census, out of South Africa’s population
of 45 million, just under one million foreign nationals are legally
resident in the country. However, the Department of Home
Affairs repeats its earlier discredited claims that there are more
than seven million undocumented migrants.
47
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•

48

Three Somalis are attacked by a dog pursuing a burglar. When
the policemen are asked to control their dog one responds with:
“Don’t tell me what to do you f----ing foreigners.” Witnesses
speak of the policemen claiming that they were checking to see if
the dog could still bite.
The chairperson of SAHRC accuses the Department of Home
Affairs of being “rabidly xenophobic.”
SAMP releases a second report on South African attitudes to
migrants. The report warns that xenophobic attitudes could turn
violent.
Wits academics, Klaaren and Ramji, release report highly critical
of xenophobia and abuse of migrants by the police force
SAMP argues that the number of undocumented migrants in
South Africa is grossly exaggerated. The Head of Statistics South
Africa, Mark Orkin, agrees and withdraws an earlier HSRC study.
South African residents of the Zandspruit settlement near
Johannesburg force hundreds of Zimbabwean residents from the
area and burn dozens of homes after a Zimbabwean is accused of
killing a local woman.
Violent clashes break out in Milnerton between Angolans and
South Africans who accuse the migrants of taking their jobs and
women. Three Angolans and one South African, accused of killing one of the migrants, are killed.
Writing in ANC Today, President Mbeki criticizes South Africans
for their attitudes to other Africans.
The SAHRC winds up its Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign due
to lack of funding.
Parliament passes a new Immigration Act. As a result of criticisms
of earlier drafts by human rights organizations, the Act promises
to combat xenophobia but does not say how.
A Nigerian man is beaten to death by three South African policemen.
A National Refugee Baseline Survey carried out by CASE finds
that “Almost two thirds of applicants (63%) perceived South
Africans in a negative light. In one third of the cases, applicants
indicated that South Africans do not like foreigners, that they
are xenophobic, and that they often refer to applicants as “makwerekwere” (a hate name for foreigners). In addition, 28% of
applicants indicated that South Africans are particularly hostile
and aggressive, often due to being ignorant about the plight of
refugees.”
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•

2004
•
•

•
•

A survey carried out in Johannesburg and Hillsbrow finds that
two thirds of respondents believe that foreigners are responsible
for crime. 40 percent of foreigners surveyed have the same opinion.
Protests erupt at Lindela over claims of beatings and inmate
deaths, coinciding with hearings into xenophobia by SAHRC and
parliament’s portfolio committee on foreign affairs.
Violence breaks out between Xhosa and Shangaan speaking peoples in informal settlements near Rustenburg. Two are killed, four
are injured and 52 families are displaced when their shacks are
burned down.
A fifteen year old South African boy is picked up by police who
attempt to repatriate him to Mozambique, claiming that he is too
dark to be South African.
A Somali shop owner is shot dead in broad daylight in his own
shop on Christmas Day. Nothing is stolen and xenophobia is
thought to be the motive.

2005
•

Three Somali refugees are stabbed to death outside their shop.
The attacks are thought to be motivated by xenophobia and
resentment of their successful businesses.
• A Human Rights Watch report documents the harassment,
mistreatment and extortion of asylum-seekers and refugees by
law enforcement agencies, the arrest, detention and threat of
deportation of refugees and asylum-seekers as “illegal foreigners”,
and the unlawful detention and threats of deportation at Lindela
Repatriation Centre.
•	146 people are arrested for malicious damage to property and
theft following attacks on twelve foreign-owned businesses in
Viljoenskroon.
• Zimbabwean and Somali refugees are beaten in Bothaville, in the
Free State. The attacks occur after a community protest against
the local municipality, and are accompanied by looting.

2006
•



Somali shop owners in a township outside Knysna are chased out
of the area and at least 30 spaza shops are damaged. Tensions
start when an 18-year-old South African is shot by a Somali
shopkeeper. After police arrest four robbery suspects and a shop
owner, a crowd goes to all the Somali-owned shops in the area
and destroys them.
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•
•
•
•
•
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Violent riots erupt in Choba between foreigners and local residents, who claim that the migrants steal their jobs. Two are killed,
including a Zimbabwean man who is burned to death.
Two Zimbabweans are killed in violent clashes between
South Africans and foreigners in the informal settlement of
Olievenhoutbosch.
Violence erupts against foreigners in Plettenburg Bay. Local residents claim that the migrants are stealing their jobs. At least one
man is killed.
Attacks occur against Somalis in the Cape Flats. During a period
of just over a month, somewhere between 20 and 30 people are
killed in townships surrounding Cape Town. Shops are robbed
and looted. At least one Somali woman is shot, execution style,
at a taxi rank.
Somali-owned businesses in the informal settlement of Diepsloot,
outside Johannesburg, are repeatedly torched.
A gang vandalises more than 20 tuck-shops and fruit stalls owned
by Mozambicans in Zamdela. 10 Mozambicans are injured when
they are pelted with stones in the same attack.
Somali refugees in Masiphumelele are attacked and shops looted
and torched. Dozens are forced into hiding.
The Baltimore Sun publishes an article called “Rising Tide of
Xenophobia” about the particularly violent form of xenophobia
that exists in South Africa.
UNHCR notes its concern over the increase in the number of
xenophobic attacks on Somalis. The Somali community claims
400 people have been killed in the past decade.
Anti-Somali riots are held in Port Elizabeth. Reuters reports
that about 40 Somalis have been killed in Western Cape in a six
month period.
In Motherwell, over one-hundred Somali-owned shops are looted
in a 24 hour period. A day later, more than four hundred Somalis
leave the township in fear, most without any of their belongings.
Mobs of youths destroy and loot shops belonging to Bangladeshi,
Pakistani, Somali, and Ethiopian shop-owners in Ipelegeng near
Schwiezer-Reneke.
More than 20 people are arrested after shops belonging to
Somalis and other foreign nationals are torched during antigovernment protests in Khutsong township, southwest of
Johannesburg.
Shops owned and staffed by non-nationals are attacked and loot-
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•
•

ed in Delmas. 40 non-nationals flee and are temporarily accommodated at mosques and with friends.
A pub in Port Elizabeth bans Nigerians.
Two Somali men are burnt alive in their shop in Mossel Bay the
night after another Somali man is killed by armed gangs in Cape
Town.

2008
January:
• Jeffrey’s Bay: A crowd of residents attack Somali-owned shops
and many Somali nationals seek shelter at the police station.
• Soshanguve: Four foreign nationals break into a spaza shop
owned by a local trader. Residents apprehend the suspects and
burn one to death. Residents call for foreigners to leave. Shacks
are burnt and shops belonging to non-nationals looted. Many
non-nationals flee the area.
• A community forum in Albert Park indicates that they want all
foreign nationals living in the area to leave.
February:
• Itireleng: At a community meeting residents are encouraged to
chase foreign nationals out of the area. Violent clashes take place.
Shacks and shops are burnt and others looted.
• Valhalla Park: Residents forcefully evict at least five Somali shop
owners from the area.
March
• Choba: 2 Zimbabweans are beaten to death by residents.
• Atteridgeville: At least 7 lives are lost in a series of attacks over a
week. The deceased include Zimbabwean, Pakistani and Somali
nationals as well as a South African who was mistaken for a foreign national. Approximately 150 shacks and shops are burnt
down, destroyed or vandalized. Approximately 500 people seek
refuge elsewhere.
• Diepsloot: 3 Zimbabweans are killed and shacks destroyed.
• Human rights organisations condemn a spate of xenophobic
attacks around Pretoria that leave at least four people dead and
hundreds homeless.
• Worcester: A large group of Zwelethemba informal settlement
residents destroy foreign-run shops and leave a large number of
foreign nationals homeless.
April
• Diepsloot: 30 shacks belonging to Zimbabweans are destroyed following a community meeting.
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•

Mamelodi: Fifteen shacks and spaza shops are burnt down. One
girl is burnt to death in her shack.

11 May
• Alexandra: The most recent spate of xenophobic attacks begin
when an angry mob takes to the streets in Alexandra Township,
targeting foreigners who they say are not welcome in the country.
Two are killed.
12 May
• Alexandra: A man is shot dead as violence continues.
13 May
• Alexandra: Foreigners take refuge at police stations and elsewhere to prevent further violent assaults on themselves and their
property.
14 May
• Alexandra: Relative calm returns on Wednesday night following
violence clashes between residents and the police. Heavy police
presence in the township is maintained.
• Diepsloot: A mob throws stones at police and loots spaza shops.
One man is injured.
15 May
• Cleveland: 5 people are killed and 50 injured in xenophobic
attacks.
17 May
• Violence spreads to Thokoza and Tembisa.
18 May
• Alexandra: Another foreigner is shot.
19 May
• The death toll rises to 22 with many more injured and over 200
arrested.
20 May
• Boksburg: 1 person is killed and 2 critically injured in attacks.
• Johannesburg: 2 refugees taking refuge in a police station are seriously injured when they are stabbed on their way from the station
to the shops.
21 May
• Violence spreads from Gauteng to Mpumalanga and KwaZuluNatal. President Mbeki approves military involvement in the 
situation as the death toll climbs to 42.
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23 May
• Violence spreads to Cape Town. Somalis and Zimbabweans are
attacked by mobs and their shops vandalised and looted. Somaliowned shops are looted in Knysna.
• Mozambican officials claim that 10 000 of their nationals have
left South Africa and returned home since the attacks began.
24 May
• Thousands of people take part in an anti-xenophobia march
organised by churches and labour unions in Johannesburg
• President Mbeki is cricitised for his lack of action on the crisis.
25 May
• Mbeki condemns the attacks in a televised address, calling them
an “absolute disgrace.”
• Bakerton: Jacob Zuma speaks out against the attack in an address
to thousands of people.
26 May
• Safety and Security Minister Charles Nqakula claims that the
xenophobic attacks are under control. He adds that 1,384 arrests
have been made.
• The death toll stands at 56 with 342 foreign-owned shops looted
and 213 burned down. Tens of thousands more have been displaced
28 May
• The government denies having made a decision to establish
refugee camps to house those displaced by the violence. A representative from the Department of Home Affairs admits that
“temporary shelters” will be constructed.
• Police intervene when Somali nationals at a camp for displaced
persons near Pretoria attack other foreigners trying to enter the
camp.
2 June
• Hundreds of migrants, mostly Somalis, march to the South
African parliament in a demonstration against xenophobia.
3 June
• Foreigners living in camps set up for those displaced by the violence call for the involvement of the United Nations because
they claim that the South African government has failed them.
• Mbeki denies that the government was warned of the possibility
of xenophobic attacks by the National Intelligence Agency over a
year ago.
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4 June
• The government expresses its commitment to reintegrating those
affected by the xenophobic violence back into their communities.
5 June
• Senior prosecutors are appointed to oversee the prosecution of
people arrested for involvement in the xenophobic attacks. Over
140 cases have been brought to court.
7 June
• Somalis in Port Elizabeth are attacked after the alleged shooting,
by a Somali, of a local resident. Somali shop owners move their
merchandise and police guard their shops.
• The Premier of the Eastern Cape and other local politicians
gather to officially apologise to the foreign community for the
xenophobic violence of recent weeks.
14 June
• Brazzaville: a Mozambican man is stoned and burned to death.
19 June
• An Ethiopian man is shot dead in Masiphumelele two days after
returning home after the May attacks.
27 June
• Local residents in Ramaphosa warn that they are not happy about
“foreigners” returning to their community.
3 July
• A Day of Remembrance is held as a tribute to the victims of
May’s xenophobic violence.
• President Mbeki notes that the violent attacks in May were not
the result of xenophobia but rather of “naked criminal activity.”
Compiled by Ashley Hill and Kate Lefko-Everett. Sources include: UN,
Human Rights Watch, SAMP, SAHRC, Centre for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation, Wits Forced Migration Programme, Mail&Guardian Online,
ANC News Brief, BBC News
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